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Contracting for Confidential
Discovery
Seth Katsuya Endo*
One way that courts have adapted to the age of the internet is to provide
nearly instant online access to their dockets. But many important filings
remain shielded from public view as courts regularly issue stipulated
protective orders at the request of the parties. And, while the costs and
benefits of confidential discovery have been extensively discussed in the
academic literature, several important contextual developments —
including the continuing growth of electronically stored information —
prompt a reexamination. Additionally, easily searchable federal dockets
now provide a window into what is happening in actual practice.
Taking up this task, Contracting for Confidential Discovery examines
how federal trial courts dealt with 100 proposed stipulated protective orders
in January 2018. A key finding is that courts are regularly entering orders
overly favoring secrecy in a manner that is inconsistent with the governing
jurisprudence and consensus theory. The Article proposes several doctrinal
and policy interventions to rectify the most problematic common mistakes:
(1) an overreliance on boilerplate language and (2) the conflation of the
relatively low standard for keeping unfiled discovery confidential with the
much higher bar for filing materials under seal.
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INTRODUCTION
In the digital era, it is easy to feel constantly bombarded by
information.1 Even so, what remains hidden can be surprising. Despite
our seemingly exhaustive access to court records through online
databases, private confidentiality agreements between parties are
regularly entered by courts as stipulated protective orders, shielding
litigation materials from public view. The common use of stipulated
protective orders might be unexpected because, from popular media
portrayals to Supreme Court precedent, trials are presumptively open
affairs.2
The great majority of civil cases, however, never make it to that stage.3
As one district court judge explained: “[I]t is no secret that the civil jury
trial is vanishing.”4 In its place, there has been a movement towards
settlement and dispositive motions.5
1 See DANIEL J. LEVITIN, THE ORGANIZED MIND: THINKING STRAIGHT IN THE AGE OF
INFORMATION OVERLOAD 6 (2014) (explaining how, in 2011, each day, Americans were
exposed to an amount of information that would fill 175 newspapers); see also John B.
Horrigan, Information Overload, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 7, 2016),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/12/07/information-overload/ (finding that 20% of
Americans are overwhelmed by the amount information they encounter).
2 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980)
(“Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by
this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been
presumptively open.”); Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and
Discovery Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2186 (2014) (describing public trial
scene from Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird).
3 See Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: Non-Party Access to Pretrial
Information in the Federal Courts 1938-2006, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 817, 818 (2007); Judith
Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113
HARV. L. REV. 924, 928 (2000).
4 Walker v. Yamaha Motor Co., No. 6:13-CV-1546-Orl-37GJK, 2016 WL 7325518,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2016) (discussing empirical studies showing “an ongoing
escalation in the percentage of civil actions resolved without a jury trial”); see also John
H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524
(2012); Xavier Rodriguez, The Decline of Civil Jury Trials: A Positive Development, Myth,
or the End of Justice As We Now Know It?, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 333, 335-36 (2014).
5 See, e.g., Saul Levmorez & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil,
Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 354 (2018) (describing
why defendants might value confidential settlements); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes:
The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights,
124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2842-50 (2015) (discussing the court and judges encouraging
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The common thread connecting these different means of resolving
civil cases is that trials, settlement, and dispositive motions all turn on
information exchanged during discovery.6 But, in discovery — an early
stage of litigation — the presumption of public transparency is relatively
weak compared with when the case moves towards trial.7 Adding to the
opacity, civil litigants regularly agree to prohibit the public disclosure
of any information obtained in discovery through stipulated protective
orders.8
Stipulated protective orders have long been an important part of civil
litigation and are used in a wide range of cases.9 From this, a rich
academic literature and case law has developed around confidential
discovery, exploring the costs and benefits of letting parties obtain court
orders to keep sensitive material exchanged in litigation secret from the
public.10 One side of the long-standing debate champions the reduction

parties to settle). See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083
(1984) (“The allure of settlement in large part derives from the fact that it avoids the
need for a trial.”).
6 See Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation,
65 EMORY L.J. 1491, 1512-13 (2016) (“Part and parcel of the vanishing trial is a focus
on pretrial practice.”); Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against: (“Settlement” Not
Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1221 (2009) (stating that “[m]uch of the action in
modern litigation takes place in discovery . . . .”); Andrew S. Pollis, Busting Up the
Pretrial Industry, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2097, 2097 (2017) (“What has supplanted the
trial culture is not settlement alone but rather a culture of pretrial practice.”).
7 See Laurie K. Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999); see also Nixon v. Warner
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (“It is clear that the courts of this country
recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents.”). See generally Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478
U.S. 1, 8-10 (1986) (explaining that historical openness and importance of the role of
public are key factors for determination).
8 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2187.
9 See infra Part I.A (describing the history of confidential discovery and protective
orders); see, e.g., Stipulated Protective Order, A.M. v. Physicians’ Med. Ctr., P.C., No.
3:17-cv-01833, 2018 WL 6305661 (D. Or. Jan. 23, 2018) (entering stipulated protective
order in sexual abuse case); [Proposed] Stipulated Protective Order, Election Sys. &
Software, LLC v. Dominion Voting Sys., Inc., No. 1:17-cv-01172 (D. Del. filed Jan. 22,
2018) (entering stipulated protective order in patent case).
10 Compare Benham, supra note 2, Doré, supra note 7, and Craig Smith et al., Finding
a Balance Between Securing Confidentiality and Preserving Court Transparency: A Re-Visit
of Rule 76a and its Application to Unfiled Discovery, 69 SMU L. REV. 309 (2016), with
Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457
(1991) [hereinafter Discovery Controversy] and Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,
Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991).
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of barriers to production.11 When a court issues a protective order
preventing the sharing of discovery beyond the parties, a producing
party is more likely to both share material and forgo expensive
screening. On the other side, confidential discovery effectively limits
the public’s ability to access what is happening in the courts.12 And, to
this, the hidden information may reduce necessary coordination with
outside experts, socially beneficial private enforcement, and oversight
over the courts themselves.
Whether stipulated protective orders are viewed as enhancing
litigation efficiency by protecting parties’ confidential information or as
barriers to socially beneficial information-sharing about misconduct,
the practical significance is clear. And there is a need for continued
examination because the growth of electronically stored information
(“ESI”), increased access to electronic dockets, and the #MeToo
movement raise new questions about how stipulated protective orders
may be used, both now and in the future.13
Moreover, despite the sizeable amount of existing scholarship about
confidential discovery, scholars have not deeply considered how
confidential discovery is implemented in practice. Now, with the rise of
electronically searchable dockets, actual entered stipulated protective
orders are easy to find.
Taking advantage of that, this Article is the first paper to map the
confidential discovery scholarship to both the jurisprudence and
practice of stipulated protective orders. As to the former, when looking
across jurisdictions, the formal case law is highly consistent with the
theory. To the latter, the Article analyzes how federal trial courts dealt
with 100 proposed stipulated protective orders in January 2018 (the
“Case Set”). The Case Set provides a snapshot of what happens in
practice, drawing from forty-four district courts and including twentyeight types of cases.14 The survey largely is consistent with the appellate
jurisprudence and confirms the conventional understanding from the
literature. But it also reveals that courts are regularly entering orders
containing provisions which overly favor secrecy in a manner
inconsistent with the governing jurisprudence and consensus theory.
To make this more concrete, two major issues appeared in the survey.
First, the majority of orders relied on generic language to describe the
need for the protective order, obscuring an outside reader’s ability to
11 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 466-67; Miller, supra note
10, at 447.
12 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 448.
13 See infra Part I.D.
14 See infra Appendix, Table 1, for a list of all of the cases in the Case Set.
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see the particularized need for confidentiality. Second, in fifteen of these
cases, the entered stipulated protective orders conflated the standard for
filing under seal with the lesser standard for keeping unfiled discovery
confidential. This is a major mistake that contravenes both the case law
and the interests described in the related scholarship, even by the proconfidentiality camp.15 Such errors are problematic — even when any
given stipulated order is unlikely to have a formal precedential effect —
because common practice may act as persuasive informal authority and
provide examples that other courts and litigants might adopt.16
Moreover, the prevalence of mistakes in stipulated protective orders
underscores how profoundly our adversarial system of litigation relies
on robust argumentation by the parties to get the law right. Quite
commonly, when parties agree about an issue, courts do not carefully
examine the legal questions. But where the parties share an interest —
here, in secrecy — that may diverge from that of the public, courts
should not simply rubber-stamp party-proposed orders.
Part I of the Article first provides background on the confidential
discovery controversy. It sketches a short history of the governing rules
and jurisprudence. It then summarizes the consensus view of how
stipulated protective orders work, along with their costs and benefits. It
then identifies several contextual factors that make the issue especially
salient at this moment. Part II details the survey’s findings. Part III
connects the literature to both the case law and practice of stipulated
protective orders. Part IV proposes potential interventions to address
tradeoffs, including the risk of legal mistake.
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONFIDENTIAL DISCOVERY CONTROVERSY

I.

A. Short History of Confidential Discovery Rules & Jurisprudence
1.

Significant Procedural Rules Development

Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
“Rules”), custom held there was no public right of access to the limited

15 See, e.g., Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 307
(6th Cir. 2016) (“In sealing all these documents and exhibits, the parties and the district
court plainly conflated the standards for entering a protective order under Rule 26 with
the vastly more demanding standards for sealing off judicial records from public
view.”).
16 See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Horizontal Procedure 29-38 (2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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discovery available.17 Courts used their equitable powers to enforce
this.18 And this ability to prevent discovery’s abuse by limiting access to
the produced materials was not lost when the Rules created a new,
broader right of discovery.19
The most direct mechanism to prevent discovery abuse is the
protective order. When originally adopted in 1938, Rule 30(b)
authorized courts to issue protective orders that covered only
depositions.20 Ten years later, this was expanded to cover written
interrogatories and requests for admission.21 In 1970, the protective
order provisions were moved to Rule 26(c) and made applicable to all
forms of discovery.22 At the same time, the description of materials that
deserved protection was modified to reflect existing law, going from
“secret processes, developments, or research” to “a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information . . . .”23
The amended rule explicitly allows a court to affirmatively order the
discovery sought if it denies a proposed protective order.24
The Rules, however, have not only created tools to limit public access
to discovery. For example, Rule 5(d) originally required parties to file
interrogatory answers, responses to requests for admission, and
deposition transcripts with the court.25 But, in 1980, Rule 5(d) explicitly
empowered courts to excuse the filing of discovery.26 Still, some courts
and commentators viewed Rule 5 as having a strong negative
17 See Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability Litigation:
Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771, 789 (1990).
18 See id. (describing a 1912 case in which a Massachusetts court “barred the press
and other members of the public from attending a deposition on the grounds that the
deposition was not part of the formal trial”).
19 See generally Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (at Last) That the
Federal Rules Do Not Declare That Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 331, 345 (2006) [hereinafter A Modest Proposal] (describing the concerns of
framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
20 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules —
and the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 199 n.58
and accompanying text (2007).
21 See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2169 (3d ed. 2002).
22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
23 Id.
24 See id.
25 See Campbell, supra note 17, at 789; Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 833-35
(describing the history of Rule 5).
26 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5 advisory committee’s note to 1980 amendment; Campbell,
supra note 17, at 789; Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 350. See generally
Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 838-48 (describing the history of 1980 amendment).
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implication favoring public access to discovery.27 Then, in 2000, Rule
5(d) was modified again, excluding the filing of initial disclosures and
most discovery responses unless used in the action or the court orders
filing.28 This undercut arguments that the rule created a general right of
the public to access discovery.29
In 2007, Rule 5.2 was adopted.30 This rule requires the redaction of
several categories of sensitive information, such as social security
numbers, names of minors, and financial account numbers.31 It also
permits courts to order the redaction of additional information and to
limit nonparty’s remote electronic access.32 While, in practical effect,
Rule 5.2 is another mechanism by which aspects of materials exchanged
in discovery are kept private, it grew out of a broader push by Congress
to ensure that digital records did not threaten individuals’ privacy
interests and was not obviously directed at curbing discovery abuses.33
2.

Confidential Discovery, the Constitution, and Common Law

By the late 1970s, courts and scholars had begun to consider whether
the First Amendment’s protections for free speech limited courts’ ability
to issue protective orders.34 For example, in 1979, the U.S. Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia determined that a protective order
“constitute[d] direct governmental action limiting speech.”35 The
circuit court thus applied strict scrutiny to find the district court’s order
“indisputably deficient.”36 But, just five years later, the Supreme Court
rejected this view.37 Writing for a unanimous court in Seattle Times v.
Rhinehart, Justice Powell held that protective orders do not require
27 See Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 861-64; see, e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady,
594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978) (“As a general proposition, pretrial discovery must
take place in the public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public access
to the proceedings.”).
28 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment; Marcus, A
Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 351. See generally Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 84852 (describing the history of 2000 amendment).
29 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 350.
30 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment.
31 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a).
32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(e).
33 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment. See also
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 625 F.3d 1182,
1187 (9th Cir. 2010) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc).
34 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2193-94.
35 In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
36 Id. at 197.
37 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1984).
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heightened scrutiny where litigants relied on the court’s discovery
process to gain the information whose dissemination was restricted.38
The question of whether there is a common law right of access to
discovery, though, was not discussed in The Seattle Times. And, in an
earlier decision, the Supreme Court had stated:
It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general
right to inspect and copy public records and documents,
including judicial records and documents. In contrast to the
English practice, . . . American decisions generally do not
condition enforcement of this right on a proprietary interest in
the document or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit.39
The Supreme Court also provided illustrations of this general right in
practice, noting that it required access in cases involving “citizen’s
desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies” and
“in a newspaper publisher’s intention to publish information
concerning the operation of government.”40
Accordingly, an open doctrinal question governing access to
discovery is the definition of a “judicial document.”41 Some
jurisprudential lines focus simply on whether the document is filed with
the court.42 Others examine whether the document plays a role in the
adjudication process, frequently using the stage of litigation as a proxy
for that determination.43
B. Consensus View of How Stipulated Protective Orders Work
To further anchor the Article’s discussion, this Section describes how
stipulated protective orders are understood to function, drawing on the
38

See id. at 32-34.
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 59 (1978) (citation omitted).
40 Id. at 597-98.
41 Id. See generally id. at 597 (“It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a
general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial
records and documents.”).
42 See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3rd Cir. 1994) (“If
[the document] is not [filed], it is not a ‘judicial record.’”); see also Leucadia, Inc. v.
Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1993) (listing cases in
which “other courts have also recognized the principle that the filing of a document
gives rise to a presumptive right of public access”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n
v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344-45 (3rd Cir. 1986) (“Once a settlement
is filed in the district court, it becomes a judicial record, and subject to the access
accorded such records.”).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995); Anderson v.
Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986).
39
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academic literature and case law to present a picture of general
practices.
When a civil action is filed in a federal district court, Rule 26(b)(1)
permits the parties to engage in discovery, a process wherein parties use
the court’s subpoena power to demand information from each other.44
As the Supreme Court has observed, the rules governing these processes
are “accorded a broad and liberal treatment.”45 Following from the text
of Rule 26(b) and this interpretative principle, a longstanding
formulation has been that parties are presumptively entitled to any nonprivileged information relevant to a claim or defense in the case.46 And
parties are generally free to publicly disclose the information they
receive in discovery.47 Still, this broad right of access to information is
not completely untempered by limitations on the scope of discovery and
its use.48
The key procedural mechanisms for limiting the use of discovery and
protecting against its abuse are protective orders, which are commonly
entered into by stipulation rather than by contested motion.49 Rule
26(c) empowers a court to issue such an order when it finds “good
cause” calling for the protection of a party or person from “annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”50 The orders

44 See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, No. 3:11-cv-170-DGW, 2015 WL 12670381, at *2
(S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2015).
45 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (discussing this in the context
of depositions).
46 See Miller, supra note 10, at 447.
47 See Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002); Harris v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 683-84 (5th Cir. 1985).
48 See Miller, supra note 10, at 487.
49 See Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 2 (1983).
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). While not exclusive, Rule 26(c) describes the following
eight types of discovery protections: (a) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; (b)
specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation of expenses, for the
disclosure or discovery; (c) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected
by the party seeking discovery; (d) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting
the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters; (e) designating the persons who
may be present while the discovery is conducted; (f) requiring that a deposition be
sealed and opened only on court order; (g) requiring that a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be
revealed only in a specified way; and (h) requiring that the parties simultaneously file
specified documents or information in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court
directs. Id. For a discussion on the jurisprudence defining good cause, see infra
Part III.A.
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typically function by limiting the audience for material that a party
designates as confidential.51
Just as the term implies, stipulated protective orders are proposed by
the parties.52 This usually occurs at the start of a case, before discovery
has begun or early in that process, because parties wish to avoid the
costs associated with intensive screening of documents prior to
production and motion practice over whether particular documents are
entitled to confidential treatment.53
After parties propose a stipulated protective order, the court must
determine if there is good cause to issue the order.54 Illustrating the
routine nature of the approval process when the parties are in
agreement, one district court noted:
We are unaware of any case in the past half-dozen years of even
a modicum of complexity where an umbrella protective order
. . . has not been agreed to by the parties and approved by the
court.55
This, however, is not to imply that courts always grant the stipulated
protective orders proposed by parties. On occasion, courts deny joint
motions for stipulated protective orders when the proposed orders fail
to articulate why the requested protection is warranted in contravention
of local rules or binding case law.56 Courts also may, at their discretion,
modify proposed orders to manage the pretrial process and account for
the specific factual circumstances.57 One important example of when
51

See Doré, supra note 7, at 334.
See Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1067 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Protective orders are
often entered by stipulation when discovery commences.”); Doré, supra note 7, at 332-33.
53 See Doré, supra note 7, at 332.
54 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); Benham, supra note 2, at 2191-92.
55 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D.
Pa. 1981); see also Father M. v. Various Tort Claimants (In re Roman Catholic
Archbishop), 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (“While courts generally make a
finding of good cause before issuing a protective order, a court need not do so where
. . . the parties stipulate to such an order. When the protective order ‘was a stipulated
order and no party ha[s] made a “good cause” showing,’ then ‘the burden of proof . . .
remain[s] with the party seeking protection.’”) (quoting Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
307 F.3d 1206, 1211 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002)).
56 See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Am. Guardian Life Assurance Co., No.
CIV. A. 95-CV-3997, 1995 WL 653977, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1995); Horgan v.
Independence Blue Cross, No. 93-CV-2528, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1145, at *6-7 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 24, 1994).
57 See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (“The unique
character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude
to fashion protective orders.”); Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 534 (1st
52
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courts intervene is when proposed stipulated protective orders contain
provisions implicating the rights of absent third parties.58
Given courts’ broad discretion to craft protective orders and their
tendency to defer to parties’ agreements, the specific terms of any given
stipulated protective order can vary widely.59 Still, stipulated protective
orders commonly include provisions that permit parties to designate
certain types of discovery materials as confidential.60 These are known
as “umbrella” stipulated protective orders because they do not require
document-by-document designations.61 Access to the materials
designated as confidential is then frequently limited to the court,
parties, attorneys, and witnesses.62 When third parties, including
witnesses, may be shown the material, the orders typically require them
to review the stipulated protective order and agree to its terms.63
Occasionally, stipulated protective orders go further, restricting access
to all or some subset of the material to only the attorneys, experts, or
specifically named individuals.64
The initial process for protecting information under a stipulated
protective order usually permits a party to unilaterally classify material
as confidential without any consultation with the requesting party.65
But the orders generally also include a process for the requesting party

Cir. 1993) (“[T]he design of the order is in any event largely within the trial court’s
discretion.”); Generosity.org v. Generosity Beverages, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-06054-ODWKS, 2018 WL 836610 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018) (modifying an order to correct clerical
errors and to conform with judge’s individual practices); Pierson v. Indianapolis Power
& Light Co., 205 F.R.D. 646, 647 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (stating that the order must explicitly
allow that “any party and any interested member of the public [can] challenge the
sealing of particular documents”).
58 See generally In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 542 (D. Minn. 2003)
(permitting intervention of third party seeking modification of a stipulated protective
order).
59 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.432 (Stanley Marcus et al.
eds., 2004) [hereinafter MANUAL]; see also Benham, supra note 2, at 2210; Doré, supra
note 7, at 334.
60 See MANUAL, supra note 59, § 11.432; see also Benham, supra note 2, at 2189-92;
Doré, supra note 7, at 332-33.
61 See MANUAL, supra note 59, § 11.432. Sometimes, though, the term “umbrella
protective orders” means that neither the parties or the courts review the material before
designating it as confidential. See Gillard v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. Re-2, 196 F.R.D.
382, 386 (D. Colo. 2000). In those cases, courts tend to use the term “blanket protective
orders” to mean those where there is no document-by-document assessment. See id.
62 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2190-91; Doré, supra note 7, at 334-35.
63 See Doré, supra note 7, at 334-35.
64 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2191; Doré, supra note 7, at 334.
65 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2192-93; Doré, supra note 7, at 333.
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to challenge the designation.66 And to reduce the risk of error, some
orders state that produced material that is inadvertently not designated
confidential does not forever lose all protection.67
Additionally, to ensure the continued protection of confidential
material, some stipulated protective orders require the material to be
filed under seal if submitted to the court.68 Serving this same end,
clauses that call for the return or destruction of the produced material
at the end of the litigation are common.69
Despite the latitude allowing for significant variation in the terms of
individual stipulated protective orders, a number of jurisdictions have
model orders that provide a template for litigants.70 Even in districts
that do not provide a model order or otherwise discuss the substance of
stipulated protective orders in their local rules, individual judges may
have their own model orders.71 The Manual of Complex Litigation
provides a sample stipulated protective order too.72
C. Costs and Benefits of Stipulated Protective Orders
Scholarly and judicial positions on the relative merits of confidential
discovery73 tend to follow from broader conceptions about the principal
role of courts.74 For some, courts “exist to resolve disputes that are
brought to them by litigants, a bedrock principle that finds expression
in the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the

66

See Benham, supra note 2, at 2242; Doré, supra note 7, at 333-34.
See, e.g., Anita Hotchkiss & Diane M. Fleming, Protecting and Enforcing Protective
Orders: Easier Said Than Done, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 161, 167-68 (2004) (including such a
provision in the sample order).
68 See Benham, supra note 2, at 664; Doré, supra note 7, at 335. These provisions
often present a potential mistake of law as is discussed in greater detail later. See
Part III.B.
69 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2189; Doré, supra note 7, at 337.
70 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2193. A quick survey of district courts’ websites
found twenty-nine districts with model orders.
71 See, e.g., Model Protective Order, Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=
judge_info&id=737 [https://perma.cc/4FAF-3THS] (last visited Sep. 24, 2019).
72 MANUAL, supra note 59, at § 40.27.
73 Because stipulated protective orders are a common form of party-customized
procedure for keeping discovery confidential, the costs and benefits of stipulated
protective orders are well explained by the literature and case law addressing
confidential discovery. See Benham, supra note 2, at 2182.
74 See Doré, supra note 7, at 289-90.
67

University of California, Davis

1262

[Vol. 53:1249

Constitution.”75 If one views the resolution of the parties’ disputes as
the primary function of courts, then party-agreed secrecy is likely
viewed as beneficial because it should protect legitimately private
information while also promoting the efficient exchange of information
and an expanded bargaining range for settlement.76 On the other hand,
if one sees the judiciary as having a significant role in protecting a
broader public interest then confidential discovery may be cause for
concern because it can hamper public oversight of courts and the ability
of third parties to use information uncovered by the litigation.77 While
this Article does not stake out a position about the ultimate merits of
these arguments, it recognizes the practical importance of confidential
discovery and the underlying interests at stake.
1.

Privacy

Litigation-related materials can implicate privacy rights that are
entitled to protection such as might be effectuated through a stipulated
protective order. These privacy rights can be held by a party or even a
non-party.78 Illustrating the former, in a personal injury suit, a plaintiff
might be asked intrusive questions about his or her private life.79 And
the Federal Rules implicitly acknowledge the importance of these
privacy interests, as seen in Rule 5.2’s requirement that certain personal
information in court filings be redacted.80 It is generally beyond
peradventure that the interrelated privacy and property interests in
trade secrets also merit protection.81
2.

Efficient Exchange of Information

Another benefit of confidential discovery is that it facilitates the
efficient exchange of information. As one scholar put it, “a protective
75 Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 468; see also William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 236 (1979).
76 See Doré, supra note 7, at 286; Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at
482 (describing privacy interests); Miller, supra note 10, at 476 (describing privacy
benefits).
77 See Doré, supra note 7, at 289; Fiss, supra note 5, at 1085 (“Adjudication uses
public resources, and employs not strangers chosen by the parties but public officials
chosen by a process in which the public participates.”). But see Marcus, Discovery
Controversy, supra note 10, at 481-84 (critiquing the over-privileging of the public’s
interest in confidential discovery discussion).
78 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 464.
79 See id. at 482-83.
80 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2.
81 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 469-70.
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order addressing discovery confidentiality lubricates the wheels of
discovery.”82 When parties agree to keep designated discovery
confidential, the responding party is more likely to produce material for
which it otherwise might assert a privilege or relevance objection.83 This
reduces the costs of litigating discovery disputes. Additionally, the
intensive screening of voluminous material by lawyers to protect against
inadvertent production of non-material sensitive information
contributes significantly to the cost of discovery.84
However, concerns about efficient exchange of information do not
necessarily solely favor confidential discovery. Discovery sharing can
enhance the efficiency of the litigation system as a whole by reducing
redundant efforts by plaintiffs bringing separate suits against the same
defendant.85
3.

Promotion of Settlement

Current public policy promotes settlement.86 In the Federal Rules,
Rule 16 and Rule 26(f) both identify settlement as objectives.87 And a
similar push is reflected in statutes like the Civil Justice Reform Act and
numerous Supreme Court decisions.88

82 Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 357, 359 (2006).
83 See id.
84 See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES:
UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 42
(2012).
85 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2199; Doré, supra note 7, at 305; Marcus, Discovery
Controversy, supra note 10, at 496 (“More generally, however, it seems that the courts
continue to recognize that access for other plaintiffs should be allowed whether or not
it is necessary to facilitate the preparation of the case before them because such sharing
saves the courts and the litigants time and money.”).
86 See Doré, supra note 7, at 290; Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating
Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the
Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1994) [hereinafter Whose Judgment?]
(“On the one hand, on almost every occasion, judges and lawyers extol the virtues of
settlement and the desirability of enabling private accommodations among litigants to
end disputes without state-authored adjudication.” (emphasis omitted)).
87 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (“In any action, the court may order the attorneys
and any unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such
purposes as: . . . facilitating settlement.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2) (“In conferring, the
parties must consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the
possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case . . . .”); Doré, supra note 7, at
290-91.
88 See Doré, supra note 7, at 291; see, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985).
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When courts are willing to enter orders that approve parties’
agreements to keep discovery confidential, this consensual secrecy
becomes another bargaining chip that may expand the parties’
bargaining range.89 As noted above, trade secrets can be valuable and
producing parties might have a low risk tolerance regarding their
disclosure.90 Additionally, if a company is concerned about future
liability in similar cases, it might place a premium on keeping discovery
confidential in an existing case.91 Confidential discovery may also
expand the bargaining range of the parties by preventing unwarranted
reputational damage.92 Allegations based on information exchanged in
discovery are untested by a judicial fact-finder but still might carry an
imprimatur of authority.93
Confidential discovery also permits parties to communicate more
freely about their interests given the economic interests described
above.94 Moreover, even if there were no economic interest that could
increase the bargaining range, shielding sensitive material from public
disclosure should still encourage greater candor and, ultimately,
promote settlement.
4.

Public Accountability of Courts

Opponents of confidential discovery frequently argue that public
oversight of courts requires access to the materials upon which judicial
decisions are based.95 This view treats courts as agents of the public, not
just of the parties seeking a resolution to their dispute.96 It further posits
that public processes improve the accuracy of court determinations,

89 See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
469, 510-11 (1994).
90 See Miller, supra note 10, at 469-70 (describing the value of Coca-Cola’s secret
formula).
91 See id. at 436 (noting that “lawyers might seek disclosure to identify potential
plaintiffs for future suits”).
92 See id. at 491-92; Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907,
967-68 (2018) (describing reputational costs even when an organization wins the
litigation).
93 See Miller, supra note 10, at 470 (“In some instances, products have had their
reputations severely damaged by the premature release of untested information, even
when the courts or further studies later showed that the information was false.”).
94 See id. at 484-86.
95 See Doré, supra note 7, at 296; see also Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19,
at 337.
96 See Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 86, at 1527.
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educate the public about the law, and model democratic values.97 The
transparency argument is also linked with press access to discovery or
other pretrial information because publication by news outlets is the
main mechanism by which the public stays informed of the judiciary’s
actions.98
In response, proponents of confidential discovery question whether
unlimited public access to discovery might ultimately disrupt the
courts’ operations.99 If the parties and courts have to continually field
public requests, they may have to divert resources from arguing or
deciding the substantive legal issue.100
5.

Enforcement of Substantive Laws

Another concern with confidential discovery is that protective orders
may be used to hide information — such as defects in a popular product
— that would otherwise reveal a public hazard.101 This concern was
particularly relevant when product liability cases featured prominently
in litigation, as in the 1980s.102 One example is the Ford/Firestone
litigation, which stemmed from the death of hundreds of people due to
poor tire quality and vehicle design. Despite numerous lawsuits,
information about the defects took almost a decade to come to light.103

97 See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1835-36 (2014) (“In
addition to Bentham’s focus on publicity as enhancing accuracy, education, and
discipline, today’s courts serve another function — as a site of democratic practices.”);
see also Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY
L.J. 1657, 1683 (2016) (“At least some measure of transparency is a social good,
necessary not only for individual well-being but also for the successful functioning of a
democratic society. Litigation can bring to light vital information that would otherwise
remain hidden through the process of civil discovery. Litigation can reveal and draw
attention to social or regulatory problems that might otherwise go unnoticed. It can
help citizens police the government by forcing governmental entities to release
information that would otherwise be kept secret and, in so doing, promotes individual
liberty by placing an additional check on authority.” (emphasis omitted)).
98 See Miller, supra note 10, at 435-36.
99 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 484-87; Richard L. Marcus,
Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23-27 (1983)
[hereinafter Myth and Reality].
100 See Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra note 99, at 27.
101 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 458.
102 See id.
103 See Dustin B. Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in Protective-Order
Litigation, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1785-86 (2014).
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On the other hand, the number of cases in which confidential
discovery implicates such interests may be very small.104 Additionally,
government agencies already regulate product safety.105
Nonetheless, while the heyday of mass tort actions asserting product
liability claims might have passed, present-day examples of the danger
of confidential discovery remain. For example, over the past decade, a
certain make of Goodyear tires was implicated in dozens of injuries and
deaths, but there was virtually no public discussion about the product
because the evidence was shielded from disclosure by protective
orders.106 Such protective orders often shield the information forever
because as cases settle, their dockets are closed and the orders are never
revisited.107 Additionally, protective orders are increasingly sought to
protect company data about the diversity of employees as a trade secret,
which might interfere with the enforcement of civil rights laws if it
allows companies to hide identity group disparities in its practices.108
D. Changing Contextual Factors for Confidential Discovery
While the merits of confidential discovery have been debated for
many years, several new contextual changes suggest a need for
continued examination of how courts balance its costs and benefits.
Specifically, the growth of ESI, the increasing public access to electronic
dockets, and the #MeToo movement each raise new questions about the
value of confidential discovery.

104

See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 478-84.
See id. at 1481-82.
106 See Ryan Felton, How Goodyear Hid Evidence of ‘The Worst Tire Made in History’
Linked to at Least 9 Deaths, JALOPNIK (Jan. 29, 2018, 11:22 AM), https://jalopnik.com/
how-goodyear-hid-evidence-of-the-worst-tire-made-in-his-1822200424 [https://perma.
cc/XKL5-ZG83].
107 See Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some
Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 478 (2006); see
also Burt Neuborne, Limiting the Right to Buy Silence: A Hearer-Centered Approach, 90 U.
COLO. L. REV. 411, 423 (2019) (“The truth is that every single day money changes hands
in an American courthouse in the form of settlement agreements purchasing silence
about activities that might expose a powerful payor to civil liability or public obloquy.”
(emphasis omitted)).
108 See Jamillah Bowman Williams, Diversity As A Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1685,
1689-90 (2019).
105
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Growth of Electronically Stored Information

It is well understood that many rule-based reforms are aimed at
reducing the error or screening costs associated with voluminous ESI.109
The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1), which directly embedded a
proportionality requirement into the definition of the scope of
discovery, speak to this concern about economic efficiency.110 One
example of a procedural reform designed to address the costs of
producing material was the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 502,
which permits the claw-back of privileged material that was
inadvertently produced.111
The sheer quantity of ESI represents a potentially significant
challenge to standard discovery practice, including the use of stipulated
protective orders.112 The proliferation of laptops and smart phones
means people are continually producing tremendous amounts of digital
data.113 As one judge put it: “The amount of digital information that is
created every day is staggering, and many companies preserve almost
everything.”114
Looking forward, it is estimated that the world will have produced
forty-four zettabytes of data within the next five years.115 Forty-four
109 See Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1338-39
(2019) [hereinafter Discovery Hydraulics] (discussing concerns about the costs of ESI
as a driver of discovery reforms).
110 See Seth Katsuya Endo, Technological Opacity & Procedural Injustice, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 821, 828 (2018); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Electronic Agency and the
Traditional Paradigms of Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 89 (1992). This,
however, is not the only possible definition and there are compelling arguments that,
as a normative matter, social costs and non-monetizable considerations should also play
a role. See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1797-1800
(2015). Moreover, there is significant debate about whether ESI is presently putting
significant logistical pressure on litigants or the courts. See Endo, Discovery Hydraulics,
supra note 109, at 1339.
111 See Liesa L. Richter, Making Horses Drink: Conceptual Change Theory and Federal
Rule of Evidence 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2013). Note also that, as was
discussed above, the substance of Rule 502 is frequently integrated into stipulated
protective orders. See id. at 1687.
112 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 343.
113 Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171,
174 (2006); see also Betsy Barry et al., The Big ESI: Going from Big to Better in EDiscovery, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 721, 723 (2015) (“Simply put, the information
artifacts of our personal and professional lives are now mostly digital . . . .”).
114 Judge Andrew Jay Peck, A Survey of Emerging Issues in Electronic Discovery:
Foreword, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014).
115 The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the
Internet of Things, Executive Summary, IDC (Apr. 2014), http://www.emc.com/
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zettabytes is equivalent to one trillion gigabytes, and each gigabyte of
data may correspond to tens of thousands of printed pages.116
This volume, in turn, may carry significant monetary costs. A 2012
study found that production costs on a per gigabyte basis averaged
around $18,000.117 Review costs comprised more than two-thirds of the
total discovery expenses in more than half of the studied cases.118
However, when the risk of public disclosure is removed, producing
parties are less likely to fight the disclosure of information whose
relevance might be debatable. For example, in one case, two parties
agreed to a stipulated protective order to resolve a dispute over whether
deposition transcripts had to be produced.119 The producing party
explicitly noted that it was not conceding the legal point about
producing the deposition transcript, but, instead, stated that it merely
wished to avoid costly litigation.120
With respect to massive troves of emails containing both responsive
information and non-material sensitive information that might be of
gratuitous interest to the general public, and which are easily spread via
traditional and social media, ESI also raises an issue of kind in addition
to the issue of volume. Email is now an omnipresent form of workplace
communication, leading to relaxed standards in which people
commonly make statements they would not otherwise share in more
formal settings.121 And, notwithstanding any corporate training,
individuals frequently mix personal and work emails, creating an

leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/executive-summary.htm [https://perma.cc/TGA7RK9R].
116 See Joshua M. Hummel, What’s in the Future for E-Discovery? New Federal Rules
and Big Data Will Require Consideration in the Face of Continued Uncertainty, LAW PRAC.,
Mar./Apr. 2015, at 52, 56.
117 See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, WHERE THE
MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY, at xiv, 20 (2012), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/
2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf [https://perma.cc/47B7-5A5R] (finding that 73% of
e-discovery costs consists of attorneys’ fees for reviewing for relevance, responsiveness,
and privilege).
118 See id. at xv.
119 See Stipulated Protective Order at 1-2, Calise v. Brady Sullivan Harris Mill, LLC,
No. 1:18-cv-00099-WES-PAS (D.R.I. Apr. 30, 2018), ECF No. 21.
120 See id. at 2.
121 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 343-44; James H.A. Pooley &
David M. Shaw, Finding Out What’s There: Technical and Legal Aspects of Discovery, 4
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 57, 63 (1995) (“Employees say things in e-mail messages that
would never be stated directly to a person or consciously memorialized in a writing.”).
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additional risk of intrusion.122 One can easily imagine an email chain in
which a relevant document is forwarded along with a non-relevant,
sensitive conversation.123 This creates an extra risk that the nonrelevant conversation — which might involve personal details or
commentary on other business associations — will be used strategically
against the producing party in the public sphere beyond the contours
of the particular case.124
2.

Easy Public Access to Dockets

The introduction of web-accessible electronic dockets in the early
2000s began a trend, which implicates privacy rights that are part of the
equation for assessing stipulated protective orders.125 Virtually all
federal district courts have adopted the Case Management/Electronic
Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system, which provides electronic access to case
dockets through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(“PACER”) interface.126 Many courts now require parties to use the
electronic filing system,127 which fundamentally changes the public’s
practical access to court documents by reducing the transaction costs of

122 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 343-44; Mark Huleatt-James &
Richard Lewis, Managing Electronic Disclosure: Part Two, CROSS BORDER Q., Jan.–Mar.
2007, at 47-48.
123 See CRAIG BALL, RE-BURN OF THE NATIVE (2007), reprinted in NERDY THINGS
LAWYERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE (2012) (“Like their counterparts
on e-mail servers, local container files weave together the user’s responsive and nonresponsive items with privileged and personal messages; consequently, they’re more like
self-contained communications databases than paper correspondence folders.”).
124 See Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation, 2000
FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, II.B.4-C.1 (2000).
125 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 338; Peter W. Martin, Online
Access to Court Records — From Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L.
REV. 855, 863 (2008).
126 See Local Court CM/ECF Information Links, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/
cmecf/ecfinfo.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2019) [https://perma.cc/CCR5-BDQ5] (only
the District of the Northern Mariana Islands and District of the Virgin Islands have not
yet adopted this).
127 See, e.g., Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability
and Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 318 (2004) (“In
Section 205 of the E-Government Act of 2002, Congress directed the federal court
system to implement public access to the Internet by 2004 . . . .”); About CM/ECF,
TENTH CIR. CT. APPEALS, https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/clerk/cmecf (last visited Dec.
31, 2019) [https://perma.cc/L4YB-K9BJ] (“ECF became mandatory for all attorney filers
on June 1, 2009.”).
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procuring them.128 Moreover, services like Bloomberg Law make
targeted searching in PACER even easier.129
The Supreme Court has recognized that remote access to digital
public records may implicate a different privacy interest than in-person
access to the same information found in a hard copy.130 The hard-copy
record is “practically obscure” because the transaction costs of
physically visiting a courthouse to examine the records is likely high.131
And, thus, as the Supreme Court stated:
Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files,
county archives, and local police stations throughout the
country and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information.132
Non-parties have used this relatively cheap access for their own ends.
For example, credit rating agencies have been heavy users of PACER,
using the information to confirm bankruptcy filings and determine
whether individuals are either involved in other monetary lawsuits or

128 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 337; Nancy S. Marder, From
“Practical Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New Understanding of Public Information, 59
SYRACUSE L. REV. 441, 444 (2009); Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to Secrecy in Litigation,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 305, 317 (2006) [hereinafter Introduction to Secrecy]. Not
everybody agrees, though, that ECF/PACER has resulted in true public access because
of the fees it imposes. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schultze, The Price of Ignorance: The
Constitutional Cost of Fees for Access to Electronic Public Court Records, 106 GEO. L.J.
1197, 1223 (2018).
129 See The Future of Legal Tech is Here, BLOOMBERG LAW, https://pro.
bloomberglaw.com/ai-analytics/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/H5LK3DS2].
130 Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 771 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The substantial character of that interest
is affected by the fact that in today’s society the computer can accumulate and store
information that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person
attains age 80 . . . .”).
131 Marder, Introduction to Secrecy, supra note 128, at 317; see Amanda Conley et al.,
Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court Records: A
Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 789 (2012) (describing steps in getting
records from the New Jersey Supreme Court); Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note
19, at 337; Martin, supra note 125, at 865-66 (“Historically, courthouse access to paper
records had been free in only the most literal sense.”); Winn, supra note 127, at 316
(“Only those with a relatively strong interest in the information would take time out of
their day, wait in line at the clerk’s office, fill out the necessary forms, and pay the
necessary copy charges.”).
132 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 764.
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have judgments pending against them.133 This illustrates how the
system shares important information whose value “flows not from the
light it casts on the performance of the judicial system or on legal issues
but rather from what court records reveal about individuals and entities
engaged in litigation.”134
Defining these stakes, court records frequently contain sensitive
personal information, regardless of whether they were deemed
“confidential” and shielded from the public by protective order.135 For
example, a study of about fifteen years of cases from the North Carolina
Supreme Court found that case files “contained an average of 113
appearances of sensitive information per document.”136 And electronic
court records contribute to the aggregation problem wherein even
seemingly innocuous data can ultimately reveal private or sensitive
information when linked together.137
3.

The #MeToo Movement

Most of the conversation about whether stipulated protective orders
harm third parties revolves around product liability suits where there is
a large potential pool of people with effectively the same claim.138 In
such cases, the shielded information would likely be of direct use to
other claimants in future litigation, reducing the need for duplicative
discovery efforts.139 But this misses the potential psychic and
instrumental benefits of public dispute resolution processes, which may
include boosting the morale of victims and protecting them from being
singled out for retaliation. The practical significance of these benefits
has come to the fore with the #MeToo movement, a social media

133

See Martin, supra note 125, at 867-68.
Id. at 866-67. Moreover, the public cares about keeping sensitive information
private, even if it is in an otherwise public document, when its use does not serve the
public interest. See Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy Interests in Public
Records: An Empirical Investigation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 141 (2017).
135 See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical
Study, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1890-91 (2015).
136 Id. at 1857.
137 See David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of
Practical Obscurity, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1395-96 (2017); Daniel J. Solove, Access
and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137,
1185 (2002) (“Viewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day information is not all
that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait about our
personalities.”).
138 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2200.
139 See id. at 2199-2200.
134
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phenomenon in which women shared their experiences of sexual
harassment and abuse.140
Confidentiality agreements and secret settlements kept hidden
information about many repeat sexual harassers and abusers. As a
result, the secret dispute resolution processes have probably led to third
parties ending up in harm’s way.141 And the silenced plaintiffs might
also have missed out on the benefits of evidence of repeat behavior.142
But, beyond this, many individuals described feeling inspired to share
their stories and bring their claims by the collective outcry and public
support.143 For example, after several major publications featured
stories in which women alleged they were sexually abused by Harvey
Weinstein, a former influential Hollywood executive, “an increased
number of victims [were] willing to put their names ‘on the record’
(whether in the press or on social media), crack[ing] open a floodgate
of allegations against powerful men across industries, including
hospitality, journalism, tech, and law.”144 This is a significant example
of individuals becoming more aware of the critical importance of
procedure through public dialogue about substantive issues.
Moreover, this public movement has led to several policy shifts. For
example, several members of Congress introduced an act that would
void compulsory arbitration clauses in employment contracts when
applied to sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims.145
Additionally, a recent federal statute eliminated an employer’s tax
deduction for settlement payments and attorneys’ fees where the
settlement agreement is related to a claim of sexual harassment or abuse

140 See Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/
542979 [https://perma.cc/HH45-GQKL].
141 See Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Economic
Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 605, 613 (2018) (“The
outpouring of [#MeToo] stories shows that secrecy has its costs, both for third parties
who might not have been in harm’s way and for those directly involved.”).
142 See id.
143 See Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Find Eighty Percent of Women Have
Experienced Sexual Harassment, NPR (Feb. 21, 2018, 7:43 PM), https://www.npr.
org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-percentof-women-have-experienced-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/VJK2-ND5D].
144 Ann Fromholz & Jeanette Laba, #metoo Challenges Confidentiality and
Nondisclosure Agreements, L.A. LAW., May 2018, at 12.
145 Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th
Cong. § 402(a) (2017); Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act, H.R. 4570,
115th Cong. § 402(a) (2017); David S. Fortney et al., Impact of #metoo on Mandatory
Arbitration, Nondisclosure Agreements, 15 No. 6 FED. EMP. L. INSIDER 1, 1 (2018).
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and contains a confidentiality or nondisclosure provision.146 Private
employers have responded to this pressure too. As of December 2017,
Microsoft announced that it would void mandatory arbitration clauses
in its employment contracts.147
4.

Implications of the Changing Context

As early as 2006, Professor Richard Marcus presciently described both
how the growth of ESI and the increased access to electronic dockets
could tilt the balance of the confidential discovery dispute even further
towards protecting privacy.148 And courts have taken notice of these
arguments, integrating such concerns into their evaluations when
deciding whether to issue protective orders.149 While the #MeToo
movement has not yet been referenced in a discovery order, it seems
only a matter of time. Still, on balance, the first two factors are likely to
predominate and suggest that an uptick in stipulated protective orders
might be seen over time as parties and courts address the increased
volume of ESI and easily accessible dockets. And, in fact, the number of
docket mentions of stipulated protective orders goes from 2,142 in 2000
to 4,115 in 2017, with a high of 7,127 in 2013.150 While the number of
civil cases also has grown over this period, these figures still represent
a jump from mentions in 0.8% of cases in 2000 to mentions in 2.3% at
the high point in 2013.151
146 See Practical Law The Journal, GC Agenda: March 2018 (Practical Law Article W013-3500), THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://1.next.westlaw.com/w013-3500?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0&
__lrTS=20191231233541361.
147 See Fortney et al., supra note 145, at 1.
148 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19 at 337-39.
149 See, e.g., In re NHC—Nashville Fire Litig., 293 S.W.3d 547, 571-72, 571 n.22
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing
(at Last) that the Federal Rules Do Not Declare that Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (2006), and finding that public access was not warranted).
150 The author searched across all federal district court dockets for the term
“stipulated protective order,” which gave a rough sense of how much they were being
proposed and the relative frequency over time. The author would guess that there are
at least two or three mentions per actual order assuming the term shows up in both the
docket entry for the proposal and the court disposition of the proposal.
151 The author compared docket mentions with the total number of pending civil
cases at the year’s end as provided on the U.S. District Courts website. See Table C-1.
U.S. District Courts — Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12Month Period Ending December 31, 2006, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/statistics_import_dir/C01Dec06.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/UEE8-6GD5]; Table C-1. U.S. District Courts — Civil Cases
Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31,
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The observed increase does not, however, answer whether the
contextual developments should change how often stipulated protective
orders are used. While the jurisprudence governing stipulated
protective orders has largely tracked with the concerns identified in
both sides of the academic literature, the overarching principle in the
case law has been deference to individual courts’ weighing of the
competing factors.152 This is most consistent with the scholars who have
questioned the general approach of the pro-transparency camp that calls
for virtually blanket access to discovery, whether filed or not.153 But it
also highlights that, once the First Amendment arguments are excluded,
the positions of the two camps in the confidential discovery debate are
close to each other. The main difference is just in the default posture
and in which direction the error costs are placed. On that front, as is
discussed later,154 judges often enter proposed stipulated protective
orders without engaging in a robust substantive analysis. Such
casualness suggests, at least, some minimal pro-transparency
interventions are warranted, particularly as the #MeToo movement
highlights the potential harms of secrecy. At the same time, there may
also be an increasing need for confidential discovery given the cost and
privacy concerns associated with the growth of ESI and easier access to
electronic dockets. Maintaining a fair balance will be key.

2007, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_
dir/C01Dec07.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQR5-ZZV2] (last visited Jan. 4, 2020); Table C1. U.S. District Courts — Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12Month Period Ending December 31, 2016, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_c1_1231.2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QPG-KPUB]
(last visited Jan. 4, 2020); Table C-1. U.S. District Courts — Civil Cases Commenced,
Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2017, U.S.
COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-1/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/
2017/12/31 [https://perma.cc/5ULX-XLAQ] (last visited Jan. 4, 2020). There were
274,639 pending cases at the end of 2007 and 338,013 pending cases at the end of 2017,
which corresponds to a 2.1% compound annual growth rate in total pending cases over
the ten-year period.
152 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (“To be sure, Rule
26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is
appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”).
153 See, e.g., Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 331-32; Miller, supra note
10, at 429-42.
154 See infra Part III.
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CASE SET’S FINDINGS ABOUT HOW STIPULATED PROTECTIVE
ORDERS OPERATE IN ACTUAL PRACTICE

Neither the academic literature nor the jurisprudence grapples much
with the on-the-ground practice of stipulated protective orders beyond
broadly describing how they function and analyzing court opinions.
But, as Professor Elizabeth McCuskey noted, when studying legal
decisions, one must look at both “orders (available only on dockets)
and opinions (available on dockets and mostly on commercial
databases) to make holistic observations about outcomes.”155 And,
given that federal dockets are increasingly easy to access and search, it
is likely that such orders will start to play a larger role in how society
understands legal rules and the work of the judiciary.156 Moreover,
practicing lawyers and litigants care greatly about — and are impacted
by — these orders and what they suggest about how the law functions
and how it might evolve.157
This Article provides a window into what courts are doing in their
everyday practice by examining a set of 100 orders on proposed
stipulated protective orders from January 2018. This period was
selected to provide the most up-to-date set of orders while also allowing
sufficient time for challenges to arise. This is a cross-sectional snapshot,
drawing from forty-four district courts and encompassing twenty-eight
different types of cases.158
The Case Set comes from PACER, found via Bloomberg Law searches
for docket entries or documents where the terms “joint” or “stipulated”
appeared within four words before the terms “protective” or
“confidential,” which appeared within two words of the term “order.”159
155

Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 522 (2016).
See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 681, 730 (2007).
157 See id. at 730-31.
158 See infra Tables 1-3.
159 PACER was not designed — and is not optimized — for research. See Michael
Kagan et al., Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO. L.J. 683, 689
(2018) (describing how PACER is a different tool than Lexis or Westlaw and that
“[e]ven the case information that is theoretically available is difficult to access”). But
Bloomberg Law provides an easier way to search through PACER, particularly at a
national level. See Mary Sheridan Newman et al., Here a Docket, There a Docket: Part II,
LEGAL INFO. ALERT, vol. 52, no. 5, 2010, at 3-4 (describing how Bloomberg Law provides
more effective access to PACER). Of course, even Bloomberg Law’s PACER records are
not always completely accurate. See Mark Giangrande, What’s in Your Toolbox for Using
PACER for Empirical Research?, LAW LIBR. BLOG (Aug. 4, 2014), https://llb2.com/2014/
08/04/whats-in-your-toolbox-for-using-pacer-for-empirical-research/ [https://perma.
cc/F59R-J3VP] (“Since PACER dockets on Bloomberg are not updated on a real-time
156
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The results were then screened for orders entered between January 1,
2018 and January 31, 2018.
This Article does not use the data to assert any statistically significant
finding — that is a project for the future.160 Still, the Case Set likely
captures a large portion of the stipulated protective orders from the time
period and does not have any obvious skew.161 For example, of the top
six districts by average docket mentions from 2007-2017, four districts
were also in the top six of the Case Set, as measured by the percentage
of orders the districts account for in the Case Set.162 The fifth district by
average docket mentions finished with the seventh highest percentage
of orders in the Case Set.163
The cases within the Case Set were mostly of types that are likely to
involve sensitive personal information or trade secrets. Twenty-three
orders were filed in cases categorized as civil rights claims with eighteen
of these dealing with employment issues.164 Eighteen orders involved
copyright, patent, or trademark claims.165 Seventeen orders were filed
in contract cases.166 A dozen orders were entered in labor cases and
another twelve were filed in personal injury ones.167
The Case Set tends to confirm the understanding of stipulated
protective orders described above. For example, all of the orders
basis, the results were significantly incomplete.”). Still, it should be reasonably accurate
given that the Case Set is looking back six months.
160 During his time as a former strategy consultant, the author has engaged in data
analyses ranging from, colloquially, “two points defines a line and that is a trend,” to
using sophisticated statistical software like SPSS and STATA. In consultation with
experts, a sample size of about 375 would permit drawing statistically significant
conclusions from the data. While the author did not create a sample that large, the
results confirm the anecdotal impressions of numerous litigation experts and stand on
their own as discrete observations.
161 There are only about 4,000 mentions of the search terms across all federal dockets
per year, which would suggest an average of about 330 mentions per month.
Additionally, one would expect the terms to show up more than once in each docket,
generally in close proximity, because there should be, at minimum, an entry with its
proposal and one for its entry or denial. Thus, while this Article does not purport to
draw any statistical inferences from the data, the 100 dispositions should be a good
portion of the actual orders from the time period. From discussions with experts, a
sample size of about 375 would permit the possibility of statistically significant findings.
162 The top six districts each had 4% or more of total docket mentions, providing an
easy cut-off. The seven top district courts in both the case set and overall docket
mentions are laid out infra Table 4 in the Appendix.
163 See infra Appendix, Table 4.
164 See infra Appendix, Table 3.
165 See infra Appendix, Table 3.
166 See infra Appendix, Table 3.
167 See infra Appendix, Table 3.

2020]

Contracting for Confidential Discovery

1277

provide umbrella protections, permitting the parties to designate
material “confidential” and shield it from general disclosure. All but one
of the entered orders call for the return or destruction of the material at
the conclusion of the litigation.168 And eighty-five of the entered orders
explicitly continue after the end of the litigation.
The Case Set also illustrates courts’ tendency to approve proposed
stipulated protective orders. Out of the 100 proposed orders, only five
were denied.169 Four were denied because they did not establish good
cause.170 And two of those four denials also noted that the proposed
orders conflated the standard for keeping filing under seal with the
standard for keeping unfiled discovery confidential.171 Twelve orders
modified the proposed stipulations, either correcting a conflation or
making the specified dispute resolution processes conform to the
judge’s chamber practices.172 The remaining eighty-three were approved
without any changes.173
Figure 1. Court Dispositions of Proposed Stipulated Protective Orders
Denied
Modified 5%
12%
Granted
83%

168 See Stipulated Protective Order at 2, Idrissu v. Aerotek, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-13794
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2018), ECF No. 10 (entering order). The order was uncommonly
short, running just two double-spaced pages. But there was nothing otherwise patently
outlying about this case alleging a violation of a Michigan civil rights statute related to
the plaintiff’s pregnancy and subsequent non-promotion at the defendant company.
169 Infra Figures 1-2. Note, too, that, after the initial count but before publication,
revised stipulated protective orders were approved in all five of these cases after counsel
addressed the concerns of the respective courts. This means that, in the set of 100
orders, there was (at least) one or more case(s) involving a movie star/professional
wrestler than there were cases in which the parties did not ultimately get to have a
confidentiality order.
170 See infra Figure 2.
171 See infra Figure 2.
172 See infra Figure 1; infra Figure 3.
173 See infra Figure 1.
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Figure 2. Reasons for Denials (by Case)

Figure 3. Modifications to Proposed Orders (by Case)

Further conforming to expectations from the literature, the stipulated
protective orders were entered relatively early in the cases. The average
length of time between the initial filing of the case and the entry of the
protective order was 113 days. The quickest was just eleven days.174 The
longest was 434 days.175
Overall, the Case Set is mostly solicitous of third-party interests.
Eighty-six of the entered stipulated protective orders include
protections for third parties. But this came at a cost: seventy-six of the
entered orders required third parties to acknowledge that they were

174 See Confidentiality Stipulation and Protective Order at 15, Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt.
LP v. GSO Capital Partners L.P., No. 1:18-cv-00232 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No.
52 (entering stipulated protective order in securities case filed on January 11, 2018).
175 See Order Granting Joint Motion for Entry of Stipulated Protective Order at 8,
Declue v. United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co., No. 1:18-cv-00425 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2018),
ECF No. 48 (entering stipulated protective order in case filed on Nov. 18, 2016). In this
case, the stipulated protective order was proposed after a good deal of case activity,
including the filing of motions to dismiss, amended complaints, and motions to stay.
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shown, and agree to be bound by, the stipulated protective order before
protected materials can be shown to them. On the other hand, one of
the proposed orders was denied for including this same provision.176
Ultimately, in none of the cases did the docket reflect that any entity
actually intervened to either assert a confidentiality claim or challenge
a confidentiality designation between January and August 2019.
The Case Set did not, however, confirm all of the general practices
described above. For example, forty-five of the ninety-five granted
orders include “highly confidential” (or similar) protections that
restrict access to the attorneys in the case, technical experts, or a very
small subset of the parties.177 That said, it is not clear the designation
was actually used in every case where the order contains that type of
provision. To this point, in only twenty-one cases did parties file any
material under seal at all. And, of these, four of the six patent cases
involved sealed filings, which might warrant that sort of more restrictive
access.
The Case Set also offers some new insights. For example, it
demonstrates that practice can be imperfect.178 Implicitly
acknowledging the fallibility of lawyers, seventy-eight entered orders
explicitly state that inadvertent failures to designate material as
confidential or inadvertent production of privileged materials would
not constitute waivers. Additionally, as will be discussed in further
detail later, more than half of the entered orders failed to include a
particularized showing of need.179 And fifteen entered orders
themselves contained a mistake of law in which the standard for filing
176 Order at 1, Woods v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-00281 (W.D. Mich. Jan.
4, 2018), ECF No. 38 (denying proposed stipulated protective order in a disability
employment case). The subsequently approved version removed the last sentence from
the following provision:

(7) Others by Consent. Other persons only by written consent of the
producing party or upon order of the Court and on such conditions as may be
agreed or ordered. All such persons shall execute the certification contained
in Attachment A, Acknowledgment of Understanding and Agreement to Be
Bound.
177 A few types of cases seemed to include these provisions. All but one (i.e., twentytwo of twenty-three) of the copyright, patent, personal injury-health
care/pharmaceutical personal injury/product liability, personal property, other fraud,
and trademark cases included this provision. Only one other category of case type
(“other statutory actions,” with three of five) had more entered stipulated protective
orders that included such a provision than not.
178 While this itself might not be a terribly new insight, the particular instantiations
of lawyer imperfection have not been widely discussed before.
179 See infra Figure 4 and Part III.B.
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material under seal was conflated with the lower standard for keeping
unfiled discovery confidential.180
The Case Set suggests that stipulated protective orders typically are
bilateral. Only eleven orders used definitions that explicitly restrict
confidentiality designations to only one party. In these instances, the
definitions related to clear party-specific concerns. For example, one
case involved the sexual abuse of a minor and her personal information
was shielded by the stipulated protective order.181 Another case
involved personnel records of absent third parties who were employees
of a company being sued for work-related discrimination.182

180 See Stipulated Protective Order, FotoNation Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No.
2:17-cv-00669 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2018), ECF No. 45; Stipulated Protective Order,
Harrison v. MetLife Grp., Inc., No. 4:17-cv-00412 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2018), ECF
No.16; Order on Motion for Protective Order, RPG Receivables Purchase Grp., Inc. v.
WKW Erbsloeh N. Am., LLC, No. 4:17-cv-01916 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2018), ECF No.
16; Proposed Stipulated Protective Order, First Solar, Inc. v. Absolute Process
Instruments, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-08518 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2018), ECF No. 26;
Confidentiality Order, Caprate Events, LLC v. Knobloch, No. 1:17-cv-05907 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 18; Stipulated Protective Order, Desai v. Lowe’s, No. 4:17-cv02485 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 9; Stipulated Protective Order, Richland
State Bank v Agspring Miss. Region, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-01007 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2018),
ECF No. 14; Protective Order, Depositors Ins. Co. v. Broan-Nutone, LLC, No. 4:17-cv02597 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 22; Stipulated Protective Order, Idrissu v.
Aerotek, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-13794 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2018), ECF No. 10; Stipulated
Protective Order, Ruiz v. FCA US LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00326 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2018),
ECF No. 20; Confidentiality and Protective Order, Thompson v. McCullen, No. 3:17cv-00255 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2018), ECF No. 13; Protective Order, Alarm.com Inc. v.
ipDatatel, LLC, No. 4:18-cv-02108 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2018), ECF No. 37; Stipulated
Protective Order, Myatt v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-03102 (W.D. Ark. Jan.
5, 2018), ECF No. 12; Protective Order, Forum US, Inc. v. Southern Roller LLC, No.
4:17-cv-03764 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2018), ECF No. 7.
181 See Stipulated Protective Order at 2, A. M. v. Yates, No. 3:17-cv-01833 (Jan. 23,
2018), ECF No. 11 (entering order).
182 See Protective Order on Stipulation at 2, Cottone v. Does, No. 1:17-cv-01006
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2018), ECF No. 13 (entering order protecting records of city
employees who were not parties to the suit).
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III. MAPPING THE CONFIDENTIAL DISCOVERY THEORY TO THE
JURISPRUDENCE & PRACTICE OF STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDERS
A. Confidential Discovery Theory & Stipulated Protective Order
Jurisprudence
The case law governing stipulated protective orders primarily relies
on interpretations of Rule 26(c)’s good cause requirement.183 As
discussed above, constitutional and common law principles do not play
a direct significant role in the analysis.184 Instead, a court is given broad
discretion in its assessment as to whether a proposed stipulated
protective order meets the good cause standard required by Rule
26(c).185 However, this discretion is bounded by a jurisprudence that
calls for balancing several factors, which are largely consistent with the
competing interests described in the confidential discovery literature.186
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit articulated these
interests in Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson as follows:
1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests;
2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate
purpose or for an improper purpose;
3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party
embarrassment;
4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information
important to public health and safety;

183 This analysis is generally understood to function similar to statutory
interpretation. See Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 (2014); see also David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive
Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 929 (2011).
But see Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101
MINN. L. REV. 2167, 2168 (2017); Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL
L. REV. 123, 125 (2015).
184 See supra Part I.A.2.
185 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).
186 There appears to be a robust exchange between the judiciary and the academy.
The scholarship, as it must, discusses the important case law. But the judiciary also has
taken note of the scholarly debates. For example, a leading case from the Third Circuit
extensively quoted Professor Miller’s article in its discussion of the relevant factors to
consider. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994)
(quoting Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991)).

1282

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 53:1249

5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will
promote fairness and efficiency;
6) whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality
is a public entity or official; and
7) whether the case involves issues important to the public.187
Here, the parties’ privacy and autonomy interests are prominently
featured.188 Additionally, courts may account for how a stipulated
protective order promotes settlement as part of its efficiency analysis.189
At the same time, the interests of third parties and the public are also
present in the above-listed Glenmede factors. To this, the general case
law holds that party agreement alone is not sufficient to demonstrate
good cause.190 This corresponds to the line of thought in the academic
literature that assigns some public function to the judiciary and a
concern about the enforcement of substantive laws.191
Even prominent voices in favor of confidential discovery
acknowledge that there are instances in which the public’s interests are
sufficiently weighty to counsel against the issuance of a stipulated
protective order, whether it is to ensure the accountability of courts or
to promote the private enforcement of important substantive laws.192
Consonantly, the jurisprudence requires that the parties explain, with
some degree of specificity, how keeping the designated materials
confidential will shield a party from harm.193 This harm usually takes
the form of a legitimate privacy interest such as the protection of trade
secrets or shielding an entity from undue, non-monetizable

187

Glenmede Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).
See id.
189 See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 785-89 (cautioning against general consideration of how
confidentiality promotes settlement but permitting specific showing).
190 See Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858-60 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that stipulated protective order was improperly issued). Even where the parties
stipulate, the court must independently determine whether the requirements of Rule
26(c) are satisfied, but there is no indication the magistrate judge did so. See, e.g., In re
Violation of Rule 28(D), 635 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2011); San Jose Mercury
News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court-N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999).
191 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2188-98.
192 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 10, at 498-99.
193 Compare Makar-Wellbon v. Sony Elec., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576 (E.D. Wis. 1999)
(holding that the terms were too general), with Bayer AG & Miles, Inc. v. Barr Lab.,
Inc., 162 F.R.D. 456, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying motion to modify existing order).
188
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embarrassment.194 It can also be the need to prevent commercial
exploitation of the information in ways unrelated to the litigation.195
The good cause analysis also integrates the common law’s
presumption of a right of access to public documents196 by how much
weight is given to the public’s interest based on the stage of litigation.197
With stipulated protective orders, clauses that only protect unfiled
confidential discovery require a lesser showing of need than those that
call for filing material under seal.198 And, with filed discovery, the
standard to shield information becomes more difficult to meet as one
goes from materials used to support non-dispositive motions to
dispositive motions and further to trial.199 Still, even the most
permissive standard requires that parties show a particularized need for
the protective order.200
Towards the more demanding end of the spectrum of good cause, as
with a motion to seal materials connected to a dispositive motion, the
parties must demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes a strong
presumption of public access.201 And “[e]ven if designated as
confidential under a protective order, discovery materials . . . lose
confidential status (absent a showing of ‘most compelling’ reasons) if
introduced at trial or filed in connection with a motion for summary
judgment.”202
194 See Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 484 (3d Cir. 1995); Pansy,
23 F.3d at 787; Shelley v. Cty of San Joaquin, No. 2:13-CV-0266 MCE DAD, 2015 WL
2082370, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2015).
195 See, e.g., Damiano v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1996).
196 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1978).
197 See Shane Grp., Inc., v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 307 (6th
Cir. 2016). Compare Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304,
1312 (11th Cir. 2001) (dispositive vs. non-dispositive), with Constand v. Cosby, 112 F.
Supp. 3d 308 (E.D. Pa. 2015), vacated, 833 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 2016).
198 See Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943,
945-46 (7th Cir. 1999).
199 See Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 572,
579, 583 (E.D. Va. 2009).
200 See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157 (3d Cir.
1993).
201 See, e.g., id.
202 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.432 (2019), annotated for DAVID F. HERR,
ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed. 2019) (listing cases from four
circuits in support). This, however, is quite muddled in practice. See The Sedona
Guidelines: Best Practices Addressing Protective Orders, Confidentiality & Public Access in
Civil Cases, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 141, 144 (2007) (noting that both the reported case law
and the comments received by the Sedona Conference Working Group “demonstrates
that litigants frequently move to seal docket entries, court filings, or whole proceedings,
citing standards applicable only in the discovery or non-dispositive context. Likewise,
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Another element of the jurisprudence that speaks both to the public’s
interest in overseeing the courts’ decision-making processes and the
rights of third parties is its treatment of third-party intervention. While
the general requirement that third-party intervention in a lawsuit be
timely is a feature of the case law dealing with stipulated protective
orders, the definition of “timely” is expansive, permitting third parties
to challenge such orders even after the lawsuit has concluded.203 Most
commonly, media entities seek to intervene in mass tort cases,
contributing to the promotion of public health and safety by publicizing
information that leads to additional regulation or private suits to
enforce the substantive law.204
Although it is rare, as part of their good cause evaluation, some courts
also decline to enter stipulated protective orders that purport to bind
third parties or limit their rights.205 For example, a district court
rejected a proposed stipulated protective order that included a provision
limiting the grounds that non-parties could rely on to challenge the
parties’ designations.206 The same court also advised the parties that
their agreement could not limit any potential waiver, as to third parties,
judges across the country are routinely presented with stipulated discovery protective
orders that the parties claim govern filings on the merits. Under the pressure of court
workloads, some judges may be tempted to improperly forgo the individual
determinations necessary to seal court documents, and instead issue orders in
accordance with the parties’ stipulations.”).
203 See, e.g., Blum v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., 712 F.3d 1349, 1353
(9th Cir. 2013) (“However, motions to intervene for the purpose of seeking
modification of a protective order in long-concluded litigation are not untimely.”);
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1994); Leucadia, 998
F.2d at 161 n.5 (“[A] district court may properly consider a motion to intervene
permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the
underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled.”); United Nuclear Corp.
v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (“We find nothing improper
in allowing intervention to challenge a protective order still in effect, regardless of the
status of the underlying suit.”); Pub. Citizen v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 786
(1st Cir. 1988) (“Because Public Citizen sought to litigate only the issue of the
protective order, and not to reopen the merits, we find that its delayed intervention
caused little prejudice to the existing parties in this case.”).
204 See, e.g., Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2001); Pierson v.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 205 F.R.D. 646, 647 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (“[T]he
protective order explicitly allows any party and any interested member of the public to
challenge the sealing of particular documents.”); Van Etten v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 263 F.3d 1304
(11th Cir. 2001).
205 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Guide Corp., 206 F.R.D. 249, 250-51 (S.D. Ind.
2001); Nestor v. Posner-Gerstenhaber, 857 So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 22,
2003).
206 See Hartford Fire Ins., 206 F.R.D. at 250-51.
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resulting in inadvertent disclosures.207 Likewise, courts have noted that
stipulated protective orders cannot prevent parties in other cases from
pursuing those materials covered by such orders.208
An exhaustive search found no instances in which a court rejected a
proposed stipulated protective order for being too one-sided.209
Nevertheless, this additional theoretical limitation can be gleaned both
from courts’ dicta and from the broader (non-stipulated) protective
order jurisprudence. Courts frequently caution parties that they cannot
shift the burden to the party challenging a confidentiality
designation.210 Courts even differ as to whether parties can agree to
provisions that require the party challenging a confidentiality
designation to file a motion with the court or whether the designating
party must affirmatively file a motion to protect the specific material
once the designation has been questioned.211 Further illustrating the
concern with one-sided agreements, in a recent federal case, a party
proposed a modification to the protective order that would only permit
its executives to access the opposing party’s “Highly Confidential”
material without providing reciprocal access.212 The district court
rejected the proposed modification because there was no reason that the
provision should only favor one party.213
207

See id.
See, e.g., Nestor, 857 So. 2d at 955.
209 While there were no instances in which a court rejected a proposed stipulated
protective order for being too one-sided, there are several instances in which courts
rejected arbitration agreements for creating discovery processes that were too unfair to
one side. See Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the
Norms Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 513-14 (2013) (discussing
concepts and citing case examples).
210 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986). But
see, e.g., Cranmer v. Colo. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:14-CV-645-MMD-VCF, 2014 WL
6611313, at *3-4 (D. Nev. Nov. 20, 2014).
211 Compare Stipulated Protective Order at 6, In re Chase Bank USA, N.A. “Check
Loan” Contract Litig., No. 3:09-md-02032-MMC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009), ECF No.
48 (entering proposed stipulated protective order with provision requiring challenging
party to file), and Trusz v. UBS Realty Inv’rs LLC, No. 3:09 CV 268(JBA), 2010 WL
3583064, at *8-9 (D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2010) (discussing challenge when producing party
designated 1.8 million documents “confidential”), on reconsideration in part, No. 3:09
CV 268(DJS), 2011 WL 121651 (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2011), and opinion vacated in part on
reconsideration, No. 3:09 CV 268(DJS), 2011 WL 124504 (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2011), with
Order Re: Joint Statement of Discovery Dispute at 2, Ramirez, v. Trans Union, LLC, No.
3:12-cv-00632 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012), ECF No. 28 (rejecting proposed stipulated
protective order with provision requiring challenging party to file).
212 See Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., No. 2:10-CV-00106-LRH-PAL, 2015 WL
3721687, at *2 (D. Nev. June 12, 2015).
213 See id.
208
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B. Confidential Discovery Theory & Stipulated Protective Order
Practice
As shown above, the case law governing stipulated protective orders
broadly tracks the scholarship on confidential discovery. But actual
court practices in entering stipulated protective orders present a more
complicated picture.
Despite the rationales identified in the scholarship and the case law
requiring a true independent examination by the courts as to whether
the parties would suffer a specific harm from public disclosure,214 the
reality of what courts are doing suggests that party agreement itself may
be sufficient for many courts to enter proposed stipulated protective
orders. In the Case Set, just four orders were denied because the parties
failed to establish good cause by articulating a particularized need for
protection.215 But the ninety-five approved orders do not suggest that
parties were truly diligent in showing the specific harm that is the crux
of a good cause finding. Rather, in the approved group, only thirty-two
orders described specific types of information to be protected or harms
that would follow from public disclosure.216 Almost twice as many
entered orders only included generic language, such as a recitation of
the list of confidential information from Rule 26(c)(1)(g) or definitions
drawn from model orders.217
Figure 4. Good Cause Language in Entered Orders

This general deference to the parties’ agreements, even in the absence
of a particularized showing of harm, also represents a break with
214
215
216
217

See Suell v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1191-92 (S.D. Ala. 2014).
See supra Figure 2.
See infra Figure 4.
See infra Figure 4.
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confidential discovery theory’s concern for third parties whose legal
rights might be affected.218 When courts enter stipulated protective
orders that lack such language, they are effectively disregarding the
interest of third parties — whether individual entities or the broader
public — in open dispute resolution processes by ignoring the good
cause requirement of Rule 26(c).219
Still, the Case Set demonstrates that the stipulated protective order
practice does not totally ignore third-party interests. Illustrating this, as
previously noted, eighty-six out of ninety-five approved stipulated
protective orders included provisions that granted rights to third
parties. The most common provisions explicitly permitted third parties
to challenge confidentiality designations or to protect their own
information. Additionally, when the case was likely to implicate the
privacy rights of specific third parties as might be seen when the
personnel information of a defendant-corporation would be material, a
few orders directly referenced them. One court initially denied a
proposed stipulated protective order because it required third parties to
sign a form acknowledging their willingness to be bound by the
order.220 With that said, third-party information generally is not well
protected by parties to the litigation.221
218 See generally Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned
in Discovery Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 808 (2002).
219 See, e.g., Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir.
2006); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994); Welle v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 3:12-cv-3016 EMC (KAW), 2013 WL 6055369,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (“Now, although Provident identifies the information
at issue as proprietary and confidential, it does not provide reasons beyond the
boilerplate references to competitive disadvantage if the information were publicly
available.”); BCI Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154, 160
(N.D. Ala. 1986) (“Moreover, the particular facts alleged by defendants in their present
motion as constituting good cause for the broad protective order sought do not impress
the Court as being anything more than ordinary garden variety or boilerplate ‘good
cause’ facts which will exist in most civil litigation.”). This, however, seems more
honored in the breach when it comes to unfiled discovery or discovery filed in support
of a non-dispositive motion. See Erichson, supra note 82, at 359, passim (explaining
why a light showing of need should be sufficient to support a finding of good cause
when a protective order is uncontested). See generally Reid K. Weisbord & David
Horton, Boilerplate and Default Rules in Wills Law: An Empirical Analysis, 103 IOWA L.
REV. 663 (2018) (discussing benefits and problems with boilerplate).
220 See Order at 1, Woods v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-00281 (W.D. Mich.
Jan. 4, 2018), ECF No. 38 (denying proposed stipulated protective order in a disability
employment case).
221 See Conley et al., supra note 131, at 781 (“Each and every form filled out by the
parties, their lawyers, or by related third parties (witnesses, jurors, etc.) potentially
contains vast amounts of personal data including home or school addresses, places of
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The Case Set did not include any denials for one-sidedness or unequal
bargaining power between the parties. Still, this concern may, perhaps,
be inferred from the bilateral nature of the approved orders.222 All
ninety-five of the approved orders presented frameworks that were
facially neutral between the parties, even in the rare instances in which
the statement of good cause described only one party’s information.
Confidential discovery theory’s concern for the enforcement of
substantive laws is complicated in practice, perhaps reflecting the divide
in the scholarship.223 All ninety-five approved orders included a general
prohibition on third-party use of the information, which reduces
parties’ ability to share information with other potential litigants. On
the other hand, four orders — all of which involved regulated entities
— explicitly permitted information sharing with regulators. And several
included provisions which acknowledged that other courts or
government entities could command the production of material
designated confidential.
Probably the most notable finding from the Case Set is a common
mistake of law in the entered stipulated protective orders wherein the
standard for filing materials under seal is conflated with that for keeping
unfiled discovery confidential. Two orders were denied on this basis.
Seven of the thirteen orders that were modified by the courts were done
to correct that mistake. These findings are promising and consistent
with the private procedural ordering theory’s basic premise regarding
the hierarchy of law that should constrain judicial discretion and trump
party agreement. But fifteen of the ninety-five approved orders
contained this mistake. In other words, more than one in seven
approved stipulated protective orders contained a significant error of
law that was ultimately imported into the court’s practice by party
agreement.
With that said, the conflation error might not be entirely driven by
the parties.224 Drawing from the findings discussed above, there were
employment, birthdates, and, in many cases, Social Security numbers.”); see also Martin,
supra note 125, at 884.
222 See generally Ramirez-Baker v. Beazer Homes, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1020
(E.D. Cal. 2008) (rejecting an argument that an arbitration agreement with discoverylimiting provisions was one-sided because the provisions were bilateral).
223 Compare Benham, supra note 2, at 2182, with Marcus, supra note 10, at 496-97.
224 See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology
as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1933-34 (2011); Jonathan S. Masur
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 666 (2015);
Diego A. Zambrano, Judicial Mistakes in Discovery, 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 217
(2018), for excellent discussions of legal mistakes. As to this particular context, it
probably rests with the parties. See, e.g., United States v. Carell, No. 3:09-00445, 2011
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twenty-five total proposed stipulated protective orders with the
conflation — a full quarter of the Case Set. But nine of the orders
entered with the mistake came from jurisdictions with a non-compliant
model order, making it difficult to fault the parties. Nevertheless, even
after subtracting those instances, the courts only correctly addressed the
parties’ conflation — through modification or denial of the proposed
stipulated protective order — about 63% of the time overall (ten of
sixteen cases). In more than a third of the instances, the courts simply
entered the flawed stipulated protective order.
C. Implications of Comparisons
1.

The Limits of Trans-Substantive Procedure

Throughout this Article, the conflation of the standard to file
materials under seal with that for keeping unfiled discovery materials
confidential has been defined as a mistake of law.225 This is consistent
with the jurisprudence as it is articulated by the appellate courts and in
the more formal opinions of district courts that are issued to resolve
disputes.226 But it is possible that, in part, the on-the-ground practice of
stipulated protective orders is one place where the courts are carving
out a special exception for certain types of claims.227 Of the fifteen
stipulated protective orders that were entered with the conflation, three
were patent cases. And courts have recognized how certain types of
cases, such as those involving patent claims, might present a differential
need for protective orders, stipulated or not.228 While this Article does
WL 1114242, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2011) (“The parties in cases often draft
proposed joint Protective Orders that violate the requirements of Procter &
Gamble and Brown & Williamson, and it appears that many attorneys are unfamiliar
with the principles set forth in these two cases.”).
225 See supra Part III.
226 See Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 307 (6th
Cir. 2016).
227 See generally Margaret B. Kwoka, Judicial Rejection of Transsubstantivity: The FOIA
Example, 15 NEV. L.J. 1493, 1495 (2015) (describing how contemporary civil procedure
is marked by the “departure from the transsubstantive design of the Federal Rules by
judicial decisions that create substance-specific procedure operating in their shadow”);
David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010) (providing a history of trans-substantive
procedure and the implications of its theoretical underpinnings).
228 See, e.g., E3 Biofuels, LLC v. Biothane Corp., No. 1:12-mc-76, 2013 WL 3778804,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 18, 2013) (“[P]articular cases, such as patent lawsuits, routinely
require protective orders . . . to protect the interests of the litigants.”); Methode Elecs.,
Inc. v. Delphi Auto. Sys. LLC, No. 09-13078, 2009 WL 3875980, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov.
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not make any claims about the general value of trans-substantive
procedure, it is easy to see how stipulated protective orders might be a
procedural mechanism that is ripe for substance-specific adaptation.229
As noted above, two-thirds of the patent cases in the Case Set involved
sealed filings — a rate that is more than three times the remainder of
the cases.
2.

Judicial Practice Trends Too Much Towards Secrecy

A second implication of the prevalence of the common legal errors in
the Case Set — that is, the standards conflation and the lack of specific
good cause language — is that courts probably are erring on the
permissive side when it comes to entering stipulated protective orders.
Both of those mistakes speak to a casualness about the public’s interest
in transparency — a vital component of the jurisprudence. As such,
while judicial discretion is an effective tool for dealing with fact-specific
questions, here, it is possible that courts are erring too much in favor of
confidential discovery. The one saving grace is that, as mentioned
above, only about one in five of the suits in the Case Set actually
involved the filing of sealed materials. And, as of August 2019, only
eighteen of the cases are still pending at the trial level (and five of this
subset have already had material filed under seal), which suggests that
there will not be a giant uptick. And, given those realities, it is possible
that courts are simply kicking the can down the road to when they are
faced with an actual sealed filing. To this, in the Case Set, two courts
subsequently denied motions to file sealed material and one court
ordered material unsealed.
3.

Considering the Relative Bargaining Power of the Parties

One final implication of the regular presence of the conflation mistake
is the concern that it could migrate from contexts in which the parties
are likely to be sophisticated actors (as with, for example, patent cases)
who deliberately — and mutually — selected the non-conforming
standard for filing materials under seal to suits in which it only benefits
17, 2009) (“Patent litigation often requires parties to disclose confidential information
to one another . . . . [T]here is danger that one party may use such information to the
competitive disadvantage of the other. The typical means to mitigate this risk is through
a protective order . . . .”).
229 See generally Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L.
REV. 1633, 1637 (2017) (arguing that “[t]he time has come for civil procedure to move
beyond rigid formalism and instead begin focusing on substantive equality.”) (emphasis
omitted).
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a sophisticated producing party to the detriment of an unsophisticated
requesting party.230 While a mutual misstatement of the law is bad
enough, the second situation presents problematic fairness concerns.231
An unsophisticated requesting party who agrees to a stipulated
protective order without understanding the importance of publicity
might lose a key negotiating element or the benefits of public
investigation that might accompany public disclosure of the uncovered
information.232 Such a circumstance might come about because it is
hard to educate individuals about the importance of procedure, and
sophisticated parties may use “cognitive biases and information
asymmetries to manipulate [individual] perceptions about procedural
terms.”233 Weaker parties might also be more vulnerable to short-term
incentives.234 Illustrating this concern, the Elliott-McGowan Productions
v. Republic Productions, Inc.235 decision is open to criticism because the
contractual provisions — limiting the inspection of a film distributor’s
financial records — may have been the product of unequal bargaining
power between a smaller production company and a larger film
distributor.236
The Case Set findings are somewhat suggestive in this regard.
Although it is difficult to assess the relative bargaining power of the
parties, there appeared to be a general preference amongst companies
for more secrecy. There were thirty-two entered stipulated protective
orders in which the parties were both either individuals or companies.
In the sole case in which both parties were individuals, the entered
stipulated protective order did not include the standards conflation. Of
the thirty-one entered orders involving companies on both sides, eight

230 See Tal Kastner & Ethan J. Leib, Contract Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1279-80
(2019) (describing how contract terms and court interpretations can migrate from
sophisticated-actor contexts to consumer contexts). See generally Marc Galanter, Why
the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 95, 97 (1974).
231 See Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 86, at 1487 (describing the normative
problems with letting a sophisticated repeat actor strategically maneuver to the
detriment of a one-shot player in the context of vacatur).
232 See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723,
732-33 (2011).
233 Id. at 762.
234 See id. at 764.
235 145 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
236 See, e.g., Federal District Court Upholds Contractual Limitation upon Discovery, 5
UTAH L. REV. 409, 412 (1957); see also Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build It, They Will
Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 579, 608 n.127 (2007).
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of the orders had the conflation. For the sixty-three entered orders in
which the parties were mixed, only seven had the conflation error.
IV. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMATIC PRACTICES
This Part explores several solutions to address the risk of legal
mistakes commonly found in court-entered stipulated protective
orders. It divides proposals into those that may be implemented locally
by courts, those that require doctrinal interventions, and legislative
responses.
A. Local Rules & Tools
Given that the formal doctrine already addresses common mistakes,
courts might consider adopting local rules or tools that would help in
the actual practice of confidential discovery.237
To this, an early hypothesis was that, if a jurisdiction had a model or
sample order, it would dictate whether the proposed stipulated
protective order included the standards conflation.238 Anecdotally, it
appears likely that the existence of a compliant model order (i.e., one
that uses the correct legal standard) helps prevent the conflation. Three
of the granted orders with the standards conflation came from
jurisdictions with a compliant model.239 Nine of the entered noncomplying orders came from jurisdictions whose model orders also
contained the mistake.240

237 Furthermore, a recent Supreme Court decision does not add to any confidence of
a top-down doctrinal shift that is going to reduce the emphasis placed on parties’
agreements. See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019)
(holding that “where commercial or financial information is both customarily and
actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an
assurance of privacy, the information is ‘confidential’ within the meaning of Exemption
4 [of the FOIA scheme]”).
238 See Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Plastic Dev. Grp., LLC, No. 3:16-CV-63, 2017 WL
710956, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 22, 2017) (noting that “courts in other circuits have
adopted pre-approved protective orders that parties in patent-infringement suits may
enter into”).
239 See infra Figure 5.
240 See infra Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Model Orders and Entered Orders’ Conflation

Although not featured in the figure above, the two proposed orders
denied, in part, for the standards conflation both came from
jurisdictions with compliant models. This suggests that district courts
might be able to prevent mistakes by providing a compliant model
order.241 This solution, though, might exacerbate the problem of parties
using overly generic language to describe the need for confidentiality.
Federal courts also can adopt local rules that promote transparency,
even if they do not directly address either the conflation or boilerplate
issues. For example, the District of South Carolina adopted a rule that
created a strong presumption against secret settlements.242 And while
such rules might have unintended downsides,243 they should prevent
parties from conflating the standard for filing under seal with a lesser
standard for keeping unfiled discovery confidential.
Courts also might be able to encourage parties to craft better, more
compliant proposed orders (or, perhaps, reduce the need for them

241 This, however, might have no helpful effect on the good cause error. Merely
parroting model order language is unlikely to capture the need for confidentiality
specific to the parties. See Stroup v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 15-CV-01389-WYD-CBS,
2016 WL 7176717, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2016) (“A ‘standard’ or ‘model’ protective
order has no talismanic value and should not substitute for counsels’ own thoughtful
analysis. Counsel should tailor a stipulated protective order to the specific needs and
circumstances of the case at hand, rather than reflexively recycling hackneyed forms.”).
242 See Local Civ. Rule 5.03(E) (D.S.C.).
243 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and
Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2006) (explaining how
“restrictions on secret settlements not only may be ineffective, but in fact may be
counterproductive” because they might “encourage parties to settle before the claimant
files suit or to choose arbitration instead of litigation,” reducing the overall amount of
public information).
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altogether) through more active management.244 When courts provide
parties with informal guidance and closely supervise discovery, it can
encourage significantly greater cooperation.245
B. Doctrinal Interventions
1.

Require More Explanation in Orders

Another potential solution would be to require more explanation in
the entered stipulated protective orders.246 Courts are generally
expected to justify their decisions with reasoning.247 But, with stipulated
protective orders, one rarely sees anything more than a general
invocation of Rule 26’s standard.248
Having to give reasons promotes deliberation and reinforces the
legitimacy of courts’ orders. As Professor Martin Shapiro explained, “A
decisionmaker required to give reasons will be more likely to weigh pros
and cons carefully before reaching a decision than will a decisionmaker
able to proceed by simple fiat.”249 This deliberative process is a clear
antidote to the problem of generic expressions of need that commonly
appeared in the entered stipulated protective orders. Moreover, a
skepticism of rote recitals speaks to the Rules Committee’s concerns
that led to the 2015 amendment to Rule 34, which prevents the use of
boilerplate objections to discovery requests.250
Additionally, in taking this time to explain its reasoning, courts
should be less likely to make the conflation mistake. To put it another
way, when courts have to explain what they are doing, they are more
likely to avoid accuracy mistakes — an essential component of their

244

See, e.g., Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, supra note 109, at 1358.
See id. at 1350-55.
246 See Portia Pedro, Stays, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 869, 915-19 (2018) (explaining
benefits of reason-giving with procedural questions).
247 See id. at 915; see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633,
633-34 (1995) (“The conventional picture of legal decisionmaking, with the appellate
opinion as its archetype and ‘reasoned elaboration’ as its credo, is one in which giving
reasons is both the norm and the ideal. Results unaccompanied by reasons are typically
castigated as deficient on precisely those grounds. In law, and often elsewhere, giving
reasons is seen as a necessary condition of rationality. To characterize a conclusion as
an ipse dixit — a bare assertion unsupported by reasons — is no compliment.”).
248 See supra Figure 5.
249 Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 180
(1992).
250 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; see also
Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, supra note 109, at 1355-56.
245
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legitimacy.251 Illustrating this, in the Case Set, thirty-two of the entered
orders did not reference any legal authority other than generic
references to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 or Federal Rule of
Evidence 502.252 This subset had thirteen orders with the conflation. In
the remaining sixty-three entered orders, there were only two orders
with the conflation.253
Figure 6. References to Legal Authorities in Entered Orders

One possible objection to this proposal is that asking courts to explain
their reasoning would unduly burden them.254 But the simple act of
writing should not create a significant opportunity cost for the courts
given that they already are charged to do this analysis.255
Another potential objection is that trial courts have broad discretion
to grant or deny proposed stipulated protective orders.256 And it follows
251 See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010)
(noting that “conducting a more detailed analysis will tend to improve the accuracy,
transparency and legitimacy of the proceedings”). See generally Michael T. Morley,
Note, Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 291, 330 (2014) (“People
reasonably may question the efficacy or legitimacy of courts if they are perceived as
being indifferent to achieving accuracy and substantive justice . . . .”).
252 See infra Figure 6.
253 See infra Figure 6.
254 See Marcus, supra note 10, at 501.
255 See Pedro, supra note 246, at 917 (“If a court is already deciding according to the
standard, the additional time it takes to explain verbally that thought process should be
reasonably short and, at least, should not be the dispositive factor for a court
determining whether to write.”). Additionally, there are other structural ways of
addressing the court-capacity costs of requiring courts to spend more time providing
reasons to litigants for their decisions. See generally F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to
Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND. L. REV. 715, 752–53 (2018).
256 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).

1296

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 53:1249

that any appellate review will be highly deferential to the trial court’s
decision, reducing the structural demand for explicit discussion of its
logic.257 Even so, this discretion is not unlimited. Thus, reason-giving
should help effectuate meaningful appellate review.258 Additionally, the
case law sets forth the factors that trial courts should consider,
providing clear instructions and enhancing uniformity of legal
principle, while still allowing for case-by-case determinations.259
Finally, legal decisions impact the rights — and lives — of parties.260
Giving reasons lets parties know that their arguments have been heard
and understood — a key component of the participation norm.261 And,
even in a circumstance in which the court is granting the parties’
requested relief, such transparency lets outsider observers understand
the rationale for the decision, adding to the accountability of courts.262
2.

Permit Partial Redactions

Instead of using stipulated protective orders to reduce the screening
costs and privacy concerns of the producing parties, an alternative tactic
frequently employed in practice is the redaction of non-relevant or
sensitive information from responsive documents.263 But Rule 34 does
257 See Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 683, 704-05 (2014); Pedro, supra note 246, at 927.
258 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 662 (1994).
259 See Effron, supra note 257, at 716 (explaining that procedural rules should lay
out the purposes of the mechanisms and how courts should consider the relevant
factors).
260 See Pedro, supra note 246, at 915.
261 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 125-27, 149-63, 175-78
(1990); Susan A. Fitzgibbon, The Judicial Itch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 485, 506 (1990) (“The
arbitral opinion contributes to the therapeutic effect [of] the process and the continuing
relationship of the parties by explaining the reasoning behind the award, demonstrating
that the arbitrator heard and considered the arguments of each side.”); Lon L. Fuller,
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978) (“Without
[reasoned] opinions the parties have to take it on faith that their participation in the
decision has been real, that the arbiter has in fact understood and taken into account
their proofs and arguments.”).
262 See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A
Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 510-11 (2015).
263 See York Grp. v. Pontone, No. 2:10-CV-1078-JFC, 2011 WL 13136290, at *3
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2011) (“Despite the absence of any provision in Rule 34 authorizing
the redaction of non-responsive information from documents produced in response to
a request for production, it is not uncommon for such redactions to be made . . . .”); JAY
E. GRENIG & JEFFREY S. KINSLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE
E-DISCOVERY AND RECORDS § 7:43 (4th ed. 2019); see also Vernon M. Winters, Secrets
Revealed: Side Effects of High-Stakes Litigation, FED. LAW., July 2001, at 30, 35
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not explicitly contemplate such redactions.264 And, while courts are
split on whether it is permissible,265 the prevailing view is that it is
“generally improper for parties to unilaterally make redactions within
responsive documents on the grounds that the redacted portions are
not relevant.”266 Courts have identified strong reasons for the dominant
trend in the case law, including the possibility of abuse, the importance
of seeing relevant information in its context, and the risk that even
proper redactions might engender distrust between the parties.267
While courts have (for good reasons) generally disfavored the
redaction of non-relevant, sensitive information in responsive
documents, it is possible that the growth of email will force a new
look.268 And Rule 5.2 already articulates a concern for keeping certain
types of information exchanged in discovery presumptively private
through redactions.269 While the United States has not gone that far,
Canada’s legal system permits redactions along such lines.270

(describing the practical costs and benefits of redacting vigorously). Speaking to the
interchangeability of the tactics, one court, in part, denied a party’s request for
permission to redact non-relevant information from responsive documents because of
the existence of a stipulated protective order. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended
Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10 ML 02151 JVS, 2012
WL 9337626, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012). In a mirroring circumstance, another
court granted a party’s request to redact non-relevant information from responsive
documents, in part, because sensitive information had been exposed to the public in
violation of an existing protective order. See In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
15-2599-MD-MORENO, 2016 WL 1460143, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2016).
264 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34; see also York Grp., 2011 WL 13136290, at *3.
265 See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp., No. 8:10 ML 02151 JVS, 2012 WL 9337626, at
*1 (“While the Special Masters recognize there is a split of authority regarding
“relevance” redactions within responsive documents, we feel that the better policy is
not to allow unilateral redactions based on relevance by the producing party.”).
266 Steven Gensler, Rule 34. Producing Documents, Electronically Stored Information,
and Tangible Things, or Entering onto Land, for Inspection and Other Purposes, in 1 FED.
RULES CIV. PROC., RULES & COMMENT. RULE 34 (Feb. 2019) (citing Christine Asia Co.,
Ltd. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 52, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)); see also, e.g.,
Jewels v. Casner, No. 12-cv-1895, 2016 WL 2962203, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2016);
Bartholomew v. Avalon Capital Grp., 278 F.R.D. 441, 451-52 (D. Minn. 2011); David
v. Alphin, No. 3:07cv11, 2010 WL 1404722, at *7-8 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2010); Steven
J. Purcell, Document Production in Federal Litigation: Can You Redact for
Nonresponsiveness?, FED. LAW., Dec. 2012, at 22.
267 See, e.g., Burris v. Versa Prods., Inc., Civil No. 07-3938, 2013 WL 608742, at *3
(D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2013).
268 See supra notes 123 and 124 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 30 and 33 and accompanying text.
270 See, e.g., Mfrs. Life Ins. Co. v. Dofasco Inc., [1989] O.J. No. 1456 (Can. Ont.
H.C.J.) (QL).
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C. Legislative Solutions
One way of addressing the conflation and boilerplate mistakes is to
simply take them off the table by legislative command. One example of
this arose in the early 1990s, when state legislatures began adopting
“open records” or “sunshine in litigation” rules.271 Texas was the first
state to enact a sunshine rule that creates a presumption that court
records are open to the general public.272 This rule permits the sealing
of court records — including unfiled discovery that deals with public
health or safety unless it is a case dealing with trade secrets or other
intangible property rights — only when a court finds that there is a
“specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs: (1)
this presumption of openness [and] (2) any probable adverse effect that
sealing will have upon the general public health or safety.”273 A few
other states followed suit but most of those reforms have a more limited
scope and the trend was effectively over before the end of the decade.274
For more than two decades, similar federal legislation has been
proposed.275 For example, in 2017, a bill was introduced that would
amend Chapter 111 of Title 28 of the United States Code, prohibiting
courts from entering a protective order to prevent the disclosure of
information relevant to the protection of public health or safety without
making an independent finding that the benefits of disclosure is
“outweighed by a specific and substantial interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of the information or records in question; and [] the
requested order is no broader than necessary to protect the
confidentiality interest asserted.”276 This bill, however, did not pass.277
The legislature could entertain more extreme changes too. The
United States is an outlier with the liberal amount of discovery that is
part of the litigation system.278 But Congress could reset that balance to
one that more closely resembles other industrially-advanced countries’

271 David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2651-52 (1995) (describing the history of “open records” and “sunshine in litigation”
rules).
272 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76(a).
273 Id.
274 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2197; Doré, supra note 7, at 314.
275 The Sunshine in Litigation Act was first introduced by Senator Herb Kohl in
1994. S. 1404, 103d Cong. (1994).
276 Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 1053, 115th Cong. (2017).
277 See id.
278 See Erichson, supra note 82, at 364 (“Even in other common law countries, such
as the United Kingdom and Canada, U.S.-style discovery is largely unknown . . . .”).
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approaches to discovery.279 Additionally, some systems — like Canada’s
— treat unfiled discovery as presumptively confidential and prohibit its
use beyond the confines of the instant case.280 Such changes, though,
would involve a radical reconception of discovery’s role in American
litigation.
CONCLUSION
Confidential discovery continues to be an important issue in
procedure. And changing contextual changes warrant continued
reexamination of the balance between efficiency and participation.
Moreover, the case law governing the primary mechanism for
effectuating confidential discovery — that is, actual orders of proposed
stipulated protective orders — nicely integrates the concerns laid out in
the academic theory. But the on-the-ground working of stipulated
protective orders shows how courts regularly over-privilege secrecy in
contravention of both the consensus academic theory and general
jurisprudence. Still, the most common mistakes — the use of boilerplate
language to define the particularized need for secrecy and an overly
permissive standard for filing under seal — may be solved by any
number of interventions, from model orders to doctrinal evolutions and
legislative action.

279

See id. at 364-65.
See D. Martin Low & Lisa Parliament, Protecting Protective Orders: Misuse of U.S.
Discovery in Canadian Antitrust Litigation, 26 ANTITRUST 38, 39 (2012) (“Under
Canadian common law, parties are under an implied undertaking to keep all documents
and information confidential, and to use them exclusively for the purposes of the
litigation in which discovery was obtained.”).
280
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APPENDIX
Table 1. List of All Cases in Case Set with Case Type and Disposition
Case Name
Fernandez v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
No. 2:17-cv-06104 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
9, 2019)
Terrazas v. Wells Fargo Bank NA,
No. 2:17-cv-04275 (D. Ariz. Dec.
18, 2018)
Gonzales-Byrd v. Cotiviti
Holdings, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-05275
(E.D. Pa. May 3, 2018)
Bulgajewski v. R.T.G. Furniture
Corp., No. 8:17-cv-02166 (M.D.
Fla Mar. 2, 2018)
Woods v. Progressive Ins. Co., No.
1:17-cv-00281 (W.D. Mich. Oct.
22, 2018)
Williams v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., No. 2:17-cv-06773 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 14, 2018)
Torres v. Lane Bryant, Inc., No.
2:17-cv-06933 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
2018)
Vigueras v. Red Robin Int’l, Inc.,
No. 8:17-cv-01422 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
20, 2019)
A Plus Fabric Inc. v. Pac. Sunwear
of Cal., LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01556
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2018)
Lang Van, Inc. v. Asia Entm’t, Inc.,
No. 8:17-cv-01481 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 20, 2018)
In-N-Out Burgers v. Smashburger
IP Holder LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01474
(C.D. Cal. June 19, 2019)
Microsoft Corp. v. Genesis
Comput. Sys., Inc., No. 8:17-cv01416 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2019)

Case Type
Labor - Other
Litigation [790]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
Consumer
Credit [480]
Civil Rights Disabilities Employment
[445]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
Labor - Other
Litigation [790]
Property Rights
- Copyrights
[820]
Property Rights
- Copyrights
[820]
Property Rights
- Trademark
[840]
Property Rights
- Trademark
[840]

Disposition
Granted
Granted
Denied
Modified

Denied

Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
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NexGen HBM, Inc. v. ListReports,
Inc., No. 2:17-cv-06522 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 21, 2019)
Honest Co., Inc. v. Jakks Pac.,
Inc., No. 2:17-cv-08072 (C.D. Cal.
May 8, 2018)
Epic Brewing Co., LLC v.
Eddyline Brewing LLC, No. 1:17cv-02637 (D. Colo. July 2, 2018)
Election Sys. & Software, LLC v.
Dominion Voting Sys., Inc., No.
1:17-cv-01172 (D. Del. July 5,
2018)
Percept Techs., Inc. v. Fove, Inc.,
No. 1:17-cv-01119 (D. Del. Mar.
15, 2018)
In re Epipen (Epinephrine
Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales
Practices & Antitrust Litig., No.
2:17-md-02785 (D. Kan. Sept. 20,
2019)
Martins v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Grp., No.
1:17-cv-12360 (D. Mass. Aug. 14,
2019)
Conley v. Nissan Motor
Acceptance Corp., Inc, No. 2:17cv-02785 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2018)
Sutton v. PlusFour, Inc., No. 2:17cv-02926 (D. Nev. July 11, 2018)
A. M. v. Physicians’ Med. Ctr.,
P.C., No. 3:17-cv-01833 (D. Or.
Mar. 21, 2018)
Evangelista v. Univ. of Phx., No.
2:17-mc-01184 (D. Utah Mar. 30,
2018)
Hulstrunk v. Ultracell Insulation,
LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00232 (D. Vt.
Aug. 16, 2018)

Case Type
Property Rights
- Trademark
[840]
Property Rights
- Trademark
[840]
Property Rights
- Trademark
[840]

1301
Disposition
Granted
Granted
Granted

Property Rights
- Patent [830]

Granted

Property Rights
- Patent [830]

Granted

Personal Injury
- Product
Liability [365]

Granted

Contract Insurance [110]

Granted

Consumer
Credit [480]

Granted

Consumer
Credit [480]
Personal Injury
- Medical
Malpractice
[362]

Granted
Granted

Other Statutory
Actions [890]

Granted

Contract Other [190]

Granted
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Carter v. Bridenstine, No. 1:17-cv01752 (D.D.C. June 21, 2019)
T. H. v. District of Columbia, No.
1:17-cv-00196 (D.D.C. Oct. 11,
2018)
TLE Mktg. Corp. v. WBM, LLC,
No. 3:17-cv-11752 (D.N.J. July 18,
2019)
110 Sunport, LLC v. Holiday
Hosp. Franchising, LLC, No. 1:17cv-01097 (D.N.M. Dec. 26, 2018)
Yeboah v. Cty. of Placer, No. 2:17cv-02449 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2018)
Bergkamp v. WBM LLC, No. 2:17cv-02533 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2018)
Tryan v. Ulthera, Inc., No. 2:17cv-02036 (E.D. Cal. June 19,
2019)
Kovacs v. Assocs. in Neurology,
P.C., No. 2:17-cv-13577 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 19, 2018)
Idrissu v. Aerotek Inc., No. 2:17cv-13794 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19,
2018)
Ford Motor Co. v. Cena, No. 2:17cv-13876 (E.D. Mich. June 20,
2018)
Young v. Walmart Stores E., L.P.,
No. 2:17-cv-13744 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 19, 2018)

Case Type
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
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Disposition
Granted

Civil Rights Other [440]

Granted

Contract Other [190]

Granted

Contract Franchise [196]

Granted

Civil Rights Other [440]

Granted

Other Statutory
Actions [890]
Personal
Property Other Fraud
[370]
Civil Rights Disabilities Employment
[445]

Granted
Granted

Granted

Civil Rights Other [440]

Granted

Contract Other [190]

Granted

Personal Injury
- Other [360]

Granted

Depositors Ins. Co. v. BroanNutone, LLC, No. 4:17-cv-02597
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2018)

Personal
Property Product
Liability [385]

Granted

Steffenson v. Wal-Mart Stores E.,
L.P., No. 1:17-cv-00306 (E.D.
Tenn. Sept. 28, 2018)

Personal Injury
- Other [360]

Granted
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Case Name
Martin v. Mgmt. & Training
Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00588 (E.D.
Tex. May 22, 2018)
Martin v. Mgmt. & Training
Corp., No. 6:17-cv-00563 (E.D.
Tex. May 11, 2018)
FotoNation Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-00669 (E.D.
Tex. Dec. 18. 11, 2018)
Attiyah v. Jones Lang Lasalle Ams.
Inc., No. 1:17-cv-01261 (E.D. Va.
May 14, 2018)
Gradillas Court Reporters, Inc. v.
Cherry Bekaert, LLP, No. 2:17-cv00597 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2018)
Martin v. Navient Sols., LLC, No.
1:17-cv-05507 (E.D.N.Y. May 21,
2019)
Lucian v. Crosstex Int’l, Inc., No.
2:17-cv-05286 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12,
2018)
Caprate Events, LLC v. Knobloch,
No. 1:17-cv-05907 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
9, 2019)
Kaplan v. Regions Bank, No. 8:17cv-02701 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19,
2019)
Pa. Prof’l Liab. Joint Underwriting
Ass’n v. Wolf, No. 1:17-cv-02041
(M.D. Pa. May 17, 2018)
RPG Receivables Purchase Grp.,
Inc. v. WKW Erbsloeh N. Am.,
LLC, No. 4:17-cv-01916 (N.D.
Ala. June 24, 2019)
Foresee Results, Inc. v. Auryc,
Inc., No. 3:17-cv-06973 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 23, 2018)
Vasilopoulos v. United Airlines,
Inc., No. 4:17-cv-05983 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 8, 2018)

Case Type
Labor - Fair
Labor Standards
Act [710]
Labor - Family
and Medical
Leave Act [751]
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Disposition
Granted
Granted

Property Rights
- Patent [830]

Granted

Civil Rights Employment
[442]

Granted

Contract Other [190]

Granted

Consumer
Credit [480]

Granted

Labor - Fair
Labor Standards
Act [710]

Granted

Other Statutory
Actions [890]

Granted

Personal Injury
- Other [360]

Granted

Constitutionality
- State Statutes
[950]

Granted

Contract Other [190]

Granted

Property Rights
- Copyrights
[820]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]

Granted
Granted
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Case Name
Briggs v. Matson, No. 3:17-cv04973 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2018)
Shaikh v. Experian Info. Sols.,
Inc., No. 3:17-cv-06486 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 6, 2018)
Roy v. MI Grp., Inc., No. 3:17-cv05800 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2018)
Vikram v. First Student Mgmt.,
LLC, No. 4:17-cv-04656 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 27, 2019)
Contour IP Holding, LLC v.
GoPro, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-04738
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2019)
Taylor v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No.
1:17-cv-04506 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5,
2019)
Cathedral Art Metal Co., Inc. v.
Divinity Boutique, LLC, No. 1:18cv-00141 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2019)
Falasco v. Gucci Am., Inc., No.
1:17-cv-07081 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9,
2018)
Associated Materials, LLC v CDC
LaRue Indus., Inc., No. 5:17-cv02355 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2018)
Declue v. United Consumer Fin.
Servs. Co., No. 1:18-cv-00425
(N.D. Ohio June 8, 2018)
Cottone v. McCracken, No. 1:17cv-01006 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15,
2018)

Case Type
Civil Rights Other [440]
Consumer
Credit [480]
Labor - Fair
Labor Standards
Act [710]
Labor - Fair
Labor Standards
Act [710]

[Vol. 53:1249
Disposition
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted

Property Rights
- Patent [830]

Granted

Contract Insurance [110]

Granted

Property Rights
- Trademark
[840]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]

Granted
Granted

Contract Other [190]

Granted

Other Statutory
Actions [890]

Granted

Civil Rights Other [440]

Granted

Lorie v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No.
0:17-cv-62151 (S.D. Fla. July 268,
2018)

Civil Rights Disabilities Employment
[445]

Granted

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC
v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No.
1:17-cv-23752 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27,
2018)

Contract Medicare Act
[151]

Granted
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Case Name
JEG & Sons, Inc. v. Commc’ns
Test Design, Inc., No. 1:17-cv23096 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2018)
Sarah S. v. Aetna Health Mgmt.,
LLC, No. 1:17-cv-23513 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 11, 2018)
Sargeant, III v. Maroil Trading
Inc., No. 9:17-cv-81070 (S.D. Fla.
June 4, 2018)
Audi AG v. USP Motorsports, Inc.,
No. 0:17-cv-62121 (S.D. Fla. June
29, 2018)
Seneff v. Ind. Univ. Health, Inc.,
No. 1:17-cv-04126 (S.D. Ind. May
3, 2019)
Harrison v. MetLife Grp., Inc., No.
4:17-cv-00412 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 3,
2018)
Martin v. Davis, No. 2:17-cv00789 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 2018)
Norris v. Glassdoor, Inc., No.
2:17717-cv-00791 (S.D. Ohio July
13, 2018)
Hart v. EM SNS LLC, No. 1:17-cv00567 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2018)
Crawford v. ABM Indus. Grp.,
LLC, No. 4:17-cv-02510 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 10, 2018)
Marshall v. Acad. Ltd., No. 4:17cv-03495 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2018)
Thompson v. McCullen, No. 3:17cv-00255 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31,
2018)

Case Type
Contract Other [190]
Labor Employee
Retirement
Income Security
Act [791]
Personal
Property Other Fraud
[370]
Property Rights
- Trademark
[840]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
Labor - Other
Litigation [790]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
Labor - Fair
Labor Standards
Act [710]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
Labor - Fair
Labor Standards
Act [710]
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Disposition
Granted

Granted

Granted

Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
Granted
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Ruiz v. FCA US LLC, No. 2:17-cv00326 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2018)
Alarm.com Inc. v. ipDatatel, LLC,
No. 4:18-cv-02108 (S.D. Tex. July
12, 2019)
Forum US, Inc. v. S. Roller, LLC,
No. 4:17-cv-03764 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
13, 2018)
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Manhattan
Jeep Chrysler Dodge, Inc., No.
1:17-cv-06415 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
2019)
First Solar, Inc. v. Absolute
Process Instruments, Inc., No.
1:17-cv-08518 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11,
2018)
Lucky Horse Press LLC v.
Earthbound Trading Co., L.P., No.
1:17-cv-06295 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13,
2018)
Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt. LP v. GSO
Capital Partners L.P., No. 1:18-cv00232 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2018)
Myatt v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
No. 3:17-cv-03102 (W.D. Ark.
Mar. 21, 2019)
Richland State Bank v. Agspring
Miss. Region LLC, No. 3:17-cv01007 (W.D. La. Apr. 18, 2018)
Woods v. Progressive Ins. Co., No.
1:17-cv-00281 (W.D. Mich. Oct.
22, 20188)
Kula v. Blackstone, No. 2:18-cv00471 (W.D. Wash. July 3, 2018)

Case Type
Personal Injury
- Motor Vehicle
Product Liab.
[355]
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Disposition
Granted

Property Rights
- Patent [830]

Granted

Property Rights
- Patent [830]

Granted

Contract Other [190]

Granted

Contract Product
Liability [195]

Granted

Property Rights
- Copyrights
[820]

Granted

Securities/
Commodities/
Exchanges
[850]
Personal Injury
- Product
Liability [365]
Personal
Property Other Property
Damage [380]
Civil Rights Disabilities Employment
[445]
Contract Other [190]

Granted

Granted

Granted

Granted
Granted
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Case Name
Verasonics, Inc. v. SuperSonic
Imagine, S.A., No. 2:17-cv-01764
(W.D. Wash. May 31, 2019)
Dengler v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 118, No. 6:17-cv-06582
(W.D.N.Y. July 31, 2019)
Olsen v. Otis Elevator Co., No.
5:17-cv-01792 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18,
2018)
Diamond Coat Epoxy LLC v. B.D.
Classic Enterprizes, Inc., No. 1:17cv-02624 (D. Colo. Sept. 17,
2018)
Baumgardner v. Cannon, No.
1:17-cv-02727 (D. Colo. Feb. 20,
2019)
Davila v. Vt. Mut. Grp., No. 1:17cv-12266 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 2018)
Green v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
No. 5:18-cv-00131 (E.D. Ky. July
30, 2019)

Turner v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., No. 5:18-cv-00078 (E.D. Ky.
Feb. 13, 2018)

York v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
No. 5:18-cv-00079 (E.D. Ky. July
30, 2019)
Rerisi v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., No.
8:17-cv-02230 (M.D. Fla. May 3,
2018)

Case Type
Property Rights
- Patent [830]
Civil Rights Employment
[442]
Real Property Tort Product
Liability [245]
Contract Other [190]
Labor Employee
Retirement
Income Security
Act [791]
Contract Insurance [110]
Personal Injury
- Health Care/
Pharmaceutical
Personal
Injury/Product
Liability [367]
Personal Injury
- Health Care/
Pharmaceutical
Personal
Injury/Product
Liability [367]
Personal Injury
- Health Care/
Pharmaceutical
Personal
Injury/Product
Liability [367]
Consumer
Credit [480]
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Disposition
Granted
Granted
Modified

Granted

Granted

Modified

Granted

Granted

Granted

Modified
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Case Name
Douglas v. DHI Grp., Inc., No.
5:17-cv-04887 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19,
2018)
Bailey v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
No. 4:17-cv-05844 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 6, 2018)
Desai v. Lowe’s, No. 4:17-cv02485 (N.D. Ohio May 25, 2018)
Upper Deck Co. v. Leaf Trading
Cards, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-02364
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018)

Case Type

[Vol. 53:1249
Disposition

Other Statutory
Actions [890]

Modified

Personal Injury
- Other [360]

Modified

Personal Injury
- Other [360]

Granted

Contract Other [190]

Granted

2020]

Contracting for Confidential Discovery

1309

Table 2. District Court Distribution of the Case Set
District
C.D. Cal.
N.D. Cal.
S.D. Fla.
S.D. Tex.
E.D. Mich.
S.D.N.Y.
D. Colo.
E.D. Cal.
E.D. Ky.
E.D. Tex.
E.D.N.Y.
N.D. Ohio
S.D. Ohio
D. Del.
D. Mass.
D. Nev.
D.D.C.
E.D. Va.
M.D. Fla.
N.D. Ga.
W.D. Mich.
W.D. Wash.

Orders
11
8
6
6
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

District
D. Ariz.
D. Kan.
D. Or.
D. Utah
D. Vt.
D.N.J.
D.N.M.
E.D. Mo.
E.D. Pa.
E.D. Tenn.
M.D. Fla
M.D. Pa.
N.D. Ala.
N.D. Cal.
N.D. Ill.
N.D.N.Y.
S.D. Cal.
S.D. Ind.
S.D. Iowa
W.D. Ark.
W.D. La.
W.D.N.Y.

Orders
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Table 3. Case Set — Case Type
Case Type
Civil Rights - Employment [442]
Contract - Other [190]
Property Rights - Patent [830]
Property Rights - Trademark [840]
Consumer Credit [480]
Labor - Fair Labor Standards Act [710]
Civil Rights - Other [440]
Other Statutory Actions [890]
Personal Injury - Other [360]
Civil Rights - Disabilities - Employment [445]
Property Rights - Copyrights [820]
Contract - Insurance [110]
Labor - Other Litigation [790]
Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical
Personal Injury/Product Liability [367]
Labor - Employee Retirement Income Security
Act [791]
Personal Injury - Product Liability [365]
Personal Property - Other Fraud [370]
Constitutionality of State Statutes [950]
Contract - Franchise [196]
Contract - Medicare Act [151]
Contract - Product Liability [195]
Labor - Family and Medical Leave Act [751]
Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice [362]
Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle Product Liab.
[355]
Personal Property - Other Property Damage
[380]
Personal Property - Product Liability [385]
Real Property - Tort Product Liability [245]
Securities/Commodities/Exchanges [850]

Number of Cases
14
11
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2020]
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Table 4. Comparison of Top Seven District Courts by Federal Docket
Mentions from 2007-2018 and Top Seven District Court Appearances
in Case Set
District
N.D. Cal.
C.D. Cal.
S.D.N.Y.
E.D. Mich.
D. Colo.
D. Or.
S.D. W.Va.

Percentage of Total
Federal District
Court Docket
Mentions
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
4%
4%

District
C.D. Cal.
N.D. Cal.
S.D. Fla.
S.D. Tex.
E.D. Mich.
S.D.N.Y.
D. Colo.

Percentage
of Orders
in Case Set
11%
8%
6%
6%
4%
4%
3%

